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Educational Malpractice: A Cause of
Action in Search of a Theory
RICHARD FUNSTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade there has been a widespread and growing
dissatisfaction with the performance of American public schools.'
* Professor, Political Science, San Diego State University. A.B., 1965; MA.,
1967; Ph.D., 1970, University of California, Los Angeles. This research was sup-
ported in part by a grant from the San Diego State University Foundation, which
assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
1. While the forums for the expression of this public mood have ranged from
school board meetings to popular news magazines, from the halls of Congress to
scholarly journals, the message has remained the same---dissatisfaction. See, e.g.,
Suing for Not Learning, TIME, Mar. 3, 1975, at 73; Saxe, Malpractice in the Class-
rooms, Newsday, Nov. 30, 1976, at 49, col. 1; Suing the Teacher, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3,
1977, at 101; Baratz & Hartle, Malpractice in the Schools, PROGRESSIVE, June, 1977,
at 33-34; Hentoff, Who's to Blame? The Politics of Educational Malpractice, LEARN-
ING, Oct. 1977, at 40; 124 CONG. REC. S14862 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978) (remarks of
Sen. Proxmire); Stull, Why Johnny Can't Read-His Own Diploma, 10 PAc. L.J. 647
(1979).
In 1978 CBS News broadcast a three-part documentary on the poor academic
performance of American public school students, "Is Anyone Out There Learn-
ing?" A pool conducted in conjunction with the programs revealed a general pub-
lic belief that the schools were incompetent. For example, of those polled 41%
responded that their children were receiving a poorer education than they them-
selves had received. While there was also a feeling that the permissiveness of so-
ciety and the influence of television were responsible for the country's educational
problems, the schools were specifically indicted for inept teaching, poor discipline,
and unnecessarily lenient promotion policies. See 124 CONG. REC. S14862 (daily
ed. Sept. 11, 1978).
Some states have taken action to correct the perceived educational inadequa-
cies. See note 298 infra. In New York, for example, a commission was appointed
to study and report on the quality, cost, and financing of elementary and secon-
dary education in the state and to make recommendations for improving the
schools in all of these areas. See NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON THE QUALrry,
COST AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN NEW YORK
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In part, this disenchantment may stem from an unarticulated op-
position to the schools' having adopted, albeit under the impera-
tive of judicial mandate, a social corrective, as opposed to
educative, role.2 Some of the most vehement attacks upon the
competency and quality of public education, however, have arisen
from those very groups which are allegedly most benefited by the
schools' change in functional emphasis.3 In either case, the
schools remain under attack.
A particularly effective appeal in this attack has been the call
for "accountability" in education.4 While considerable disagree-
ment exists over what is meant by "accountability" and to whom
the schools should be accountable,5 state legislators, local school
boards, community groups, and even teachers themselves have all
declared (not surprisingly) that they are in favor of "accountabil-
ity."6
This demand for accountability is especially powerful when
linked with legitimate public concern for the problem of "func-
STATE, THE FLEISCHMANN REPORT ON THE QUALrrY, COST AND FINANCING OF ELE-
MENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN NEW YORK STATE (1973) [hereinafter cited
as FLEISCHmAN REPORT]. The result of the study, however, was to adopt a system
of minimum competency testing. These tests are to evaluate each student's pro-
ficiency in reading, writing, and mathematics. A student is required to pass the
tests before being permitted to graduate from high school. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1979, § A, at 19, col. 2-3; id., Jan. 28, 1979, § D, at 12, col. 1. Regarding the theoretical
and practical shortcomings of minimum competency tests, see notes 294-305 infra
and accompanying text.
For a comparative perspective on the problem, see Owen, Tort Liability in Ger-
man School Law, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 72 (1955); Whincup, What Should be
Taught in School?, 127 NEW. L.J. 1020 (1977) (United Kingdom).
2. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974). See generally Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School
Superintendent, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 25; K. ALEXANDER (ed.), SCHOOL LAW (1980).
3. E.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d
929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Sugarman, Accountability through the Courts, 82 SCHOOL REV. 233
(1974); Levin, A Conceptual Framework for Accountability in Education, id., at
363; Aaron, Evaluation and Accountability, in NEW HoRIzoNs IN READING 558
(1976); L. STRAIN, ACCOUNrABILrrY IN READING INSTRUCTION (1976).
The origins of the "accountability" movement may be traced to President
NLxon's often expressed position that educators should be held responsible for
their performance. See L. BROWDER, AMERICAN ASSOCLATION OF SCHOOL ADMIms-
TRATORS, AN ADMINISTRATOR'S HANDBOOK ON EDUCATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 10
(1975); R. STICKLAND, J. PHILLIPS & W. PHILLIPS, AVOIDING TEACHER MALPRACTICE:
A PRACTICAL LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR THE TEACHING PROFESSIONAL 63 (1976).
5. See Bettinhaus & Miller, Reactions to State Accountability Programs, in A
DISSEMINATION SYSTEM FOR STATE ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAMS 5-12 (Cooperative
Accountability Project 1973).
6. But see Hentoff, supra note 1, at 43 (teacher unionization seen as a means
for avoiding accountability).
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tional illiteracy."7 Given consistently declining scores on nation-
ally standardized tests, it would appear that more and more
pupils are learning less and less. Allegedly, "it is not uncommon
today for a student enrolled in a public school to move through
the system without acquiring basic skills such as the ability to
read and write."8
One by-product of this growing number of uneducated gradu-
ates has been a burgeoning legal literature on the subject of edu-
cational malpractice.9 Taken as a whole this body of legal
commentary manifests two striking characteristics. First of all, it
is vastly disproportionate to the number of actually decided cases.
While there are numerous law review articles, notes, and com-
ments in the educational malpractice area, there have been but a
handful of decisions, only three of which are fully reported.10
7. See Note, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy the Grow-
ing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SuFFOLK U.L. REV. 27 (1979); Note, The
ABC's of Duty: Educational Malpractice and the Functionally Illiterate Student, 8
GOLDEN GATE U.L REV. 293 (1978). Exactly what constitutes "functional illiteracy"
is subject to some debate. The New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost
and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education defined a "functional liter-
ate" as a person able to read materials at a tenth to twelfth grade reading level
One unable to read at that level was, thus, by definition "functionally illiterate." 2
FEImsCHMANx REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. Among the materials that the Fleisch-
mann Commission felt a "functional literate" should be able to read and compre-
hend were driving manuals, "how to" instructions for home repair projects, and
the income tax directions. Some, including second year law students enrolled in
Tax I, may find this an unreasonably rigorous standard of functional literacy.
8. Comment, Educational Negligence: A Student's Cause of Action for Incom-
petent Academic Instruction, 58 N.C. L. REV. 561 (1980).
9. E.g., Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FonO5.
URB. L.J. 117 (1979); Note, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District: New
York Chooses Not to Recognize "Educational Malpractice," 43 ALB. L. REV. 339
(1979); Note, Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failure to Edu-
cate?, 14 TULSA W. 383 (1978); Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational
Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1978);
Comment, Educational Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L REV. 755 (1976); Note, Educa-
tional Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional
Illiteracy?, 13 SuFFOL U. L REV. 27 (1979); Comment, supra note 8.
10. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School Dist., 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584,(1977), affd, 64
App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), affd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979). The unreported decisions are McNeil v. Board of Educ., No. L-
17207-74 (Super. Ct. Law Div. N.J. May 31, 1974), reported in Elson, supra note 9, at
n.4, Garrett v. School Bd. of Broward County, No. 77-8703 (Cir. Ct. Fla. Dec. 5,
1977), reported in 10 EDUC. U. BuLL. 475 (1977), and Doe v. Board of Educ., No.
48277 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Md. July 6,1979), reported in Comment, supra
note 8, at nn. 1 & 3.
Second, the commentary is uniformly enthusiastic for the recog-
nition of some form of judicial remedy for a failure to educate.
Malpractice in other professions has been found to be legally
compensable; so, it is reasoned, malpractice in education should
be treated no differently."
The idea is that the educator (individually, collectively, or insti-
tutionally)12 has some legal obligation to carry out the function of
11. The argument seems to be that, since malpractice actions are increasing in
other professions, it is simply anomalous that educators shouldn't be subjected to
such litigation too. See, e.g., Note, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dis-
trict. New York Chooses Not to Recognize "Educational Malpractice," 43 ALB. L.
REv. 339, 358 (1979). As can readily be seen this is not a particularly compelling
piece of logic, requiring as it does several critical assumptions of both fact and pol-
icy. Moreover, there is some reason for doubting the efficacy or desirability of judi-
cial intervention in other professional malpractice areas. See notes 245 & 283-85
infra and accompanying text. So, the argument may cut in just the opposite direc-
tion from that intended by the proponents of a cause of action for educational mal-
practice. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 161-66 (4th ed. 1971); T.
ROADY & W. ANDERSEN (eds.), PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE (1960).
Perhaps a more persuasive analogy would be to products liability. There, in re-
sponse to societal demand, the courts eventually fashioned a new cause of action.
Initially, recognition of the new liability was based on a variety of theories: negli-
gence, warranty, fraud, misrepresentation, and nuisance. But today the products
liability cause of action is almost universally accepted. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw
OF TORTS 641-82 (4th ed. 1971). At most, however, all the products liability analogy
stands for is that the law of torts is evolutionary. It offers no guidance as to when
or why a new tort should be recognized and, thus, is of limited utility in determin-
ing whether educational malpractice is an appropriate candidate for such recogni-
tion.
12. The named defendants in educational malpractice actions are usually the
local school board and its officials, rather than individual teachers. In medical mal-
practice actions, however, to which educational malpractice advocates often refer,
see note 11 supra, individual physicians are often named. Moreover, in many of
the examples of educational malpractice given by these advocates, it is the con-
duct of an individual instructor that allegedly causes the harm suffered by the
malpractice victim; see, e.g., Elson, supra note 9, at 648, 659 & 667. No logical rea-
son exists, therefore, for precluding individual teacher liability. But see note 272
infra.
Whatever the teacher's liability, the local school district would be liable, either
for improper hiring, see RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965), or under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, see W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 458-91. See
also Mancke, Liability of School Districts for the Negligent Acts of Their Employ-
ees, 1 J. L. & EDUC. 109 (1972).
In the reported cases, see note 10 supra, the doctrine of governmental immunity
has not been an issue, and it is assumed for purposes of this article that educa-
tional malpractice actions will not be barred by immunity. For discussion of the
doctrine in the context of education, see Annot., 33 A.LL3d 703 (1970) (modern
status of doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to public schools and institu-
tions of higher education); 38 A.L.R.3d 480 (1971) (immunity of private schools and
institutions of higher learning from liability in tort). See also Comment, Educa-
tional Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L REv. 755, 766-67, 769 (1976).
The modern trend has been toward the abrogation of governmental and related
immunities. K. DAvis, ADmiNisTRATI LAw OF THE SEVENrrs § 25.04, at 554-57
(1976). Generally, this abrogation has been accomplished by legislation, although
in some jurisdictions it has been conditioned on the availability of insurance; see,
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.96 (Supp. 1977) (waiving tort immunity of all
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academic instruction in such a manner as to impart some minimal
level of competence in basic subjects to the student.13 Identifying
state's political subdivisions); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1403 (1959) (waiver of immu-
nity to extent of policy). But in some states the doctrine of governmental immu-
nity has been abolished by judicial action, e.g., Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist.,
55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
The United States Supreme Court has itself accelerated this trend, significantly
for the purpose of this article, in decisions rejecting immunity for school officials
for the violation of students' civil rights. For example, in Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975), the Court observed, "[I]mmunity would not be justified since it
would not sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to exercise their dis-
cretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of a remedy for students
subjected to intentional or otherwise inexcusable deprivations." Id. at 320 (foot-
note omitted). See also Comment, Immunity of Teachers, School Board Members,
and School Districts for Suit Under Section 1983 of Civil Rights Act, 1976 U. ILL. L.
F. 1129; Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School
Official, 49 So. CAL. L. REV. 1322 (1976). See generally B. FEIN, SINIIcANT DECI-
SIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1978-1979 TERM 12-16, 98-105 (1980).
Only a few states, however, have statutorily provided for direct actions against
school districts for damages caused by their boards, officers, agents, or employees.
Ripps, The Tort Liability of the Classroom Teacher, 9 AKRON L. REV. 19, 20 (1975).
13. Actually, the claims of educational malpractice that have so far been urged
upon the courts reveal that the cause of action evisioned might be broader than
the statement in the text suggests. In some instances the allegation has been that
it was educational malpractice to push a student through school on the basis of
merely social promotions, allowing that student to graduate though deficient in ba-
sic skills. E.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976). In other cases, just the opposite has been contended; ed-
ucational malpractice has been seen in a failure to advance a student to a level of
instruction which he was capable of comprehending. Hoffman v. Board of Educ.,
64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
A basic and continuing confusion exists as to whether the essence of educa-
tional malpractice consists of misfeasance-the improper performance of the edu-
cative function-or of nonfeasance-the omission of the performance. Compare
Note, supra note 11, at 339, with Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can
Johnny Sue?, 7 FORD UPs. L. J. 117, 119 n.12. In fact, the distinction is not particu-
larly helpful in analyzing claims of educational malpractice. See Hoffman v. Board
of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 388-89, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 118 (1978) (Damiani, J., dis-
senting). See also note 56 infra.
Nor are these the only disagreements among those who would have the courts
recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice. In discussing the ele-
ments of educational malpractice, its proponents sometimes seem to mean that
the schools are teaching the wrong subjects. See, e.g., Comment, Educational Mal-
practice, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 801-02 (1976). At other times, they appear to mean
that the schools are adopting the wrong pedagogical strategies. See, e.g., Elson,
supra note 9, at 746-54. Thus, it is unclear whether the schools are to be held lia-
ble for teaching an improper curriculum, albeit effectively, or for teaching appro-
priate subjects but utilizing methods that fail to convey those subjects
adequately-or for both.
As will be suggested, see notes 287 & 288 infra and accompanying text, this
amorphous nature of the proposed cause of action is an argument against its rec-
ognition by the courts.
the source of that obligation, however, has presented both com-
mentators and counsel for the inadequately educated plaintiffs
with great difficulty. To overcome this obstacle, they have gener-
ated a number of alternative theories of recovery. Some writers,
analogizing the public schools to mental hospitals, have argued
that a student who is forcibly confined to a classroom without be-
ing offered adequate instruction (treatment) is unconstitutionally
deprived of liberty without due process of law.14 Others, alleging
the existence of a contract either between the student and the
school or between the taxpayers and the school system, of which
the student would be a third-party beneficiary, have suggested a
contract-based theory of recovery.15 A third view has been that,
at least where the student has received report cards showing sat-
isfactory progress, an action for intentional misrepresentation
may lie.16 The most popular theory has been that, through either
misfeasance or nonfeasance, the failure to educate constitutes
some form of professional negligence which is remediable under
traditional tort principles.17 So far, none of these theories has
been successful in actual litigation.18
This article will examine the present case law on educational
malpractice. It will then analyze each of the principal theoretical
bases that have been advanced to support an educational mal-
practice cause of action: contract, misrepresentation, constitu-
tional right, and negligence.19 It is the article's thesis that, for one
reason or another, each of these theories is logically unsound and
inadequate to support the desired cause of action. In each case,
the theory advanced either proceeds from an inapposite analogy
or requires an unjustified extension or distortion of present doc-
trine. Moreover, even if a legally sufficient justification for recog-
nizing a cause of action for educational malpractice could be
found, compelling considerations of public policy argue against
such recognition. These considerations will be surveyed in the
14. Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FoRD. URB.
L. J. 117, 121 (1979); Note, supra note 11, at 356-57.
15. Note, supra note 11, at 357; Note, Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause
of Action for Failure to Educate?, 14 TULSA L.J. 383, 401 (1978).
16. Comment, supra note 8, at 561, n.2; see also Peter W. v. San Francisco Uni-
fied School Dist., 60 CaL App. 3d 814, 827, 131 CaL Rptr. 854, 862-63 (1976).
17. E.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 564-86; Elson, supra note 9, at 693-768.
18. See note 10 supra.
19. Still other possible theories of recovery that have been advanced are an in-
tentional tort action similar to intentional infliction of emotional distress or, where
available, a petition for mandamus. Comment, Educational Malpractice, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 755, 781-82 (intentional tort), 789-90 (mandamus) (1976). However, be-
cause either of these avenues of recovery, if available at all, could be pursued in
only a very limited number of situations, they will not be considered further in
this article.
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concluding section of this article together with their implications
for future judicial developments in this area.20
20. The scope of this article is limited to a consideration of the various theo-
retical bases advanced to support a cause of action for educational malpractice in
academic instruction and counselling of students enrolled in elementary and sec-
ondary public schools. Issues arising in the context of private education, where
contract may play a more important role, are not discussed. See, e.g., Pietro v. St.
Joseph's School, 48 U.S.L.W. 2229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk County, Sept. 21, 1979)
(dismissal of educational malpractice claim against private school by trial court,
but recognizing that a parent might be entitled to recover tuition if the school
breached an express contractual agreement with the parent that the student
would attain a certain proficiency level after completing a specified curriculum).
See generally Comment, supra note 19, at 801-03; Annot., 38 A.LR.3d 480 (1971).
Also not addressed are questions of liability presented in claims against institu-
tions, public or private, of higher education. See Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
No. A-8525 (Ch. Nashville, Tenn., Aug. 15, 1977) (university breached contractual
obligation by its failure to provide necessary faculty and funding to continue doc-
toral program); Ianniello v. University of Bridgeport, No. 10009 (C.P. Conn., June 7,
1977) (denying recovery of tuition for an unsatisfying class); Trustees of Columbia
Univ. v. Jacobsen, 31 N.J. 221, 156 A.2d 251 (1959) (affirming dismissal of misrepre-
sentation claim against university for failure to inculcate truth and wisdom), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 808 (1960). See generally Russell, Goal Accountability in Higher
Education: Towards a Comprehensive Legal Conception of the University, 7 J. L. &
EDuc. 507 (1978); Note, Consumer Protection and Higher Education-Student Suits
Against Schools, 37 Omo ST. L.J. 608 (1976); Annot., 86 A.LR.2d 489 (1962).
The tort liability of public educators for physical injuries to elementary or sec-
ondary school pupils is also beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted,
however, that in many of these cases liability has been found to arise from negli-
gent instruction. See, e.g., Matteuci v. High School Dist., 4 Ill. App. 3d 710, 281
N.E.2d 383 (1972) (physical injuries resulting from negligent instruction in the use
of dangerous machinery); Engel v. Gosper, 71 N.J. Super. 573, 177 A.2d 595 (1962)
(death caused by negligent instruction in the use of rockets); La Valley v. Stan-
ford, 272 App. Div. 183, 70 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1947) (physical injuries received in boxing
match after physical education teacher failed to instruct in defensive measures);
Gardner v. State, 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939) (physical injuries sustained in
gym class resulting from negligent instruction in customary gymnastic tech-
niques). See generally Ripps, supra note 12; Drowatsky, On the Firing Line: Neg-
ligence in Physical Education, 6 J. L. & EDUC. 481 (1977); Comment, 19 WASHBURN
L. J. 189 (1979); Comment, 19 SANTA CLARA L REV. 1125 (1979). The cases are col-
lected in Annot., 35 A.LR.3d 758 (1971) (tort liability of public schools for accidents
associated with chemistry experiments, shopwork, and manual or vocational train-
ing); Annot., 36 A.L.R3d 361 (1971) (tort liability of public schools for accidents oc-
curring in physical education classes); Annot., 38 A.LR.3d 830 (1971) (tort liability
of public schools for injuries resulting from lack or insufficiency of supervision).
In the educational malpractice actions, however, these cases have invariably been
construed as limited to their facts, holding only that public school authorities have
a duty to exercise reasonable care for the physical safety of students under their
supervision. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App.
3d 814, 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 858 (1976).
Finally, this article does not attempt to address the related question of the pub-
lic schools' duty to meet the educational needs of "special students." See, e.g.,
Gary W. v. State, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (El). La. 1976) (ordering plans for appropriate
II. THE CASE LAW
To date, the courts have been uniform in their reluctance to rec-
ognize a cause of action for educational malpractice, no matter on
what theory the claim has been predicated.2' In Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School District, the California appellate court
unanimously affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit for
failure to state a cause of action.22 Relying on public policy, the
New York Court of Appeals, although accepting the possibility
that such a cause might be properly pleaded, rejected a similar
action in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District.23 And
in Hoffman v. Board of Education the same New York Court of
Appeals refused to permit recovery in a case that might easily
have been distinguished from the two earlier educational mal-
practice suits.24
Peter W. was the first and perhaps most widely publicized suit
for non-learning. The plaintiff had attended the elementary and
secondary schools operated by the defendant district. Although
recently graduated from high school, he alleged that the district
and its employees had negligently failed to provide him with ade-
quate instruction, guidance, counseling, and supervision in basic
academic skills, such as reading and writing. His teachers had in-
stead, he maintained, allowed him to pass from one grade level to
another even though they knew or should have known that he
lacked the skills requisite for such advancement. As a result, he
had been permitted to graduate from high school even though un-
able to read beyond the eighth grade level. This reading disabil-
ity, plaintiff claimed, rendered him unable to gain meaningful
employment, and he sought to recover general damages for this
"permanent disability,"25 as well as special damages incurred as
the cost of compensatory tutoring. The school district's liability
for these damages was, according to the plaintiff, the product of
education for mentally retarded, physically handicapped, and delinquent children
as required by a due process right to adequate treatment); Mills v. Board of Educ.,
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (excluding "special students" from school violates
due process). See generally Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an Edu-
cation: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (1974).
21. See Annot., 1 A.L.R4th 1139 (1980) (tort liability of public schools and in-
stitutions of higher learning for educational malpractice). The paucity of deci-
sional guidance in this area may be suggested by the fact that this annotation, the
American Law Report's first on the subject, is but four pages in length.
22. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
23. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979), afg 64 App. Div. 2d
29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), affg 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1977).
24. 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979), revVg 64 App. Div. 2d
369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
25. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 818, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 (1976).
[voL 18: 743, 1981] Educational Malpractice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
either its negligence or its misrepresentation of his level of aca-
demic achievement.
As to the negligence claim, the court concluded that there was
no duty of care on the part of the school district or its employees
toward the plaintiff on which to base a negligence cause of action.
This conclusion being "dispositive" of the negligence action,26 the
court did not address other negligence issues presented by the
plaintiff's pleading. It did, however, indicate by way of dicta that
it entertained serious doubt as to whether a workable standard of
care could ever be conceived to apply to such an action. It also
questioned whether the plaintiff had suffered any injury within
the meaning of the law of negligence; and, even if injury had been
sustained, it suggested there was an insufficient causal link be-
tween the defendant's negligence, if any, and the plaintiffs disa-
bility.2 7
The court's discussion of the legal question of the existence of a
duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff was inextricably
linked with its consideration of broader issues of public policy.
"[I]t should be recognized," the court wrote, "that 'duty' is not
sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' '28 Ironically, the
court found support for its position in Rowland v. Christian, the
pathbreaking California Supreme Court decision that had re-
jected the common law categories to determine the legal duties
owed by owners and occupiers of land to those who came upon
that land.29 Language in Rowland had stated the "fundamental
principle" of tort liability that "all persons are required to use or-
dinary care to prevent others being injured by their conduct" ex-
cept where a departure from this principle was "clearly
supported by public policy."3 0 Taking this as its starting point,
the Peter W. court then proceeded to identify those policy factors
pertinent to a determination of duty:
The social utility of the activity out of which the injury arises, compared
26. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
27. Id. at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. 860-61.
28. Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860, quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 76, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (1968), quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 332-33
(3d ed. 1964) (emphasis added in Peter W.). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 11,
at 325-26.
29. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
30. Id. at 112, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100, 443 P.2d at 564.
with the risks involved in its conduct; the kind of person with whom the
actor is dealing; the workability of a rule of care, especially in terms of the
parties' relative ability to adopt practical means of preventing injury; the
relative ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of injury and the
availability of means by which the loss may be shifted or spread; ...
[and] in the case of a public agency defendant, the extent of its powers,
the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by
budget . . . are . .. factors which play a role in the determination of
duty.31
Examining allegations of educational malpractice in light of these
factors, the court concluded that the very context out of which
such suits would arise was an argument against allowing the
cause of action.
Rightly or wrongly, but widely, [those persons and agencies who adminis-
ter the academic phases of the public educational process] are charged
with outright failure in the achievement of their educational objectives;
according to some critics, they bear responsibility for many of the social
and moral problems of our society at large. Their public plight in these
respects is attested in the daily media, in bitter governing board elections,
in wholesale rejections of school bond proposals, and in survey upon sur-
vey.32
In such an atmosphere, to hold school districts, administrators,
and teachers to an actionable duty of care in the discharge of
their academic functions would, in the court's judgment, expose
educators to countless tort claims, both real and feigned, brought
by disaffected students and parents. The ultimate consequences,
in terms of time and money, would burden public education be-
yond calculation.
The court recognized that tort law is an evolutionary phenome-
non and that, from time to time, new areas of liability have been
sanctioned.33 But it noted that in those areas
the wrongs and injuries involved were both comprehensible and assessa-
ble within the existing judicial framework. . . . This is simply not true of
wrongful conduct and injuries allegedly involved in educational malfea-
sance. Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom
methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, cause, or in-jury.34
31. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859, quoting Raymond v. Paradise
Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8-9, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (1963).
32. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 861.
33. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Silizinoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240
P.2d 282 (1952) (intentional infliction of mental distress); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (negligent infliction of emotional distress
upon a third party observer); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968) (rejection of common law categories for determination of legal
duty of owners and occupiers of land); Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Califor-
nia, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 529 P.2d 553 (1974) (psychotherapist's duty to
warn one endangered by physician's patient).
34. Peter'W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860. Interestingly, the court chose to characterize the plaintiff's
claim as one involving malfeasance-the performance of an act wholly wrongful
and unlawful. Generally, educational malpractice claims have been framed in
terms of misfeasance or nonfeasance, rather than malfeasance. See note 13 supra.
[VoL. 18: 743, 1981] Educational Malpractice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Turning to the plaintiff's cause of action for misrepresentation,
the court found that any claim of negligent misrepresentation had
been disposed of by its prior analysis of the negligence cause of
action.35 As for intentional misrepresentation, the court held that
plaintiffs pleading was procedurally insufficient under California
law, because it failed to allege any facts showing the requisite ele-
ment of reliance upon the asserted misrepresentation.36 Again,
however, considerations of public policy were central to the
court's analysis of the plaintiff's case.
An even more candid reliance upon public policy as a basis for
rejecting a cause of action for educational malpractice is to be
found in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District.37 In an
opinion remarkable for its brevity, the New York Court of Ap-
peals conceded the possibility that "within the strictures of a
traditional negligence or malpractice action, a complaint sounding
in 'educational malpractice' may be formally pleaded."38 But the
court continued that, even if such a cause could be legally framed,
it should be rejected on public policy grounds alone. The court
was persuaded that the lack of judicial expertise in matters of ed-
ucational policy, coupled with the undue burden that would be
placed on the courts by recognizing a cause of action for educa-
tional malpractice, counseled against permitting such suits. 39 Nor
could the court overlook the availability of alternative administra-
tive procedures that allowed public school students or their par-
ents to enlist the aid of the State Commissioner of Education to
vindicate their educative rights.40
In Donohue the plaintiff had attended for four years the high
school operated by the defendant school district. Although the
plaintiff had received failing grades in several subjects, and was
unable to read, write, or comprehend simple English, he was al-
lowed to graduate. Alleging that the district had breached its
As this appears to be the only reference to malfeasance in all of the educational
malpractice cases and commentary, it may have been nothing more than a slip of
the judicial pen.
35. Id. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
36. Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863. See also 3 B. WrruKN CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
§§ 573-74 (2d ed. 1971).
37. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979), affig 64 App. Div. 2d
29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), affg 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S2d 584 (1977).
38. Id. at 442, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
39. Id., 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
40. Id. at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
duty to educate him by failing to test, evaluate, and teach him in
such a manner as to identify and remedy his ignorant condition,
the plaintiff claimed $5,000,000 in damages.
The trial court dismissed the Donohue suit for failure to state a
cause of action.41 In a long and well-reasoned opinion, the inter-
mediate appellate court, relying heavily upon Peter W., affirmed
the dismissal.42 The majority's principal point was the absence of
any legal duty to educate which the defendant school district
might be said to have breached.43 In response to Donohue's sug-
gestion that the state constitution itself imposed such a duty,44
the court noted that the provision of the constitution relied upon
by the plaintiff was clearly and specifically addressed to the state
legislature, mandating the creation and maintenance of a system
of public education. Such language, the court held, was never in-
tended to create and impose a duty on local school districts to in-
sure that each individual pupil receive a minimal level of
education.45 Moreover, even if such a duty could be said to exist,
the court indicated that a suit for educational malpractice must
fail because "the failure of educational achievement cannot be
characterized as an 'injury' .... "4 6 And, even were a duty to be
found to exist and even were there to be an injury within the
meaning of tort law, establishing a causal connection between the
breach of the duty and the injury suffered would be so specula-
tive, if not impossible, as to argue against the judiciary's enter-
taining suits for educational malpractice. 47
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals sustained, summa-
rily dismissing plaintiff's assertion of a constitutionally created
duty to educate.48 Indeed, far from supporting the plaintiff's case,
41. 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1977).
42. 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
43. Only three of the four sitting judges of the Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, joined in the opinion of the court. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Suozzi would
have recognized the cause of action, thus permitting the plaintiff to proceed to the
trier of fact. Id. at 44, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (Suozzi, J., dissenting). Justice Suozzi,
thereby, became the first judge in America to go on record as favoring a cause of
action for educational malpractice. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Justice
Suozzi was careful to emphasize that he did not find any causational link to have
been established. He simply would have permitted the plaintiff the task of proving
such a causal relationship in order to recover.
44. The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a sys-
tem of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be
educated.
N.Y. CONST. art. XI § 1.
45. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 40, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 880.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
48. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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the court found that the state constitution created a presumption
against recognizing such causes of action. The purpose of the sec-
tions cited by the plaintiff was, held the court, "to make all mat-
ters pertaining to the general school system of the state within
the authority and control of the department of education and to
remove the same so far as practicable and possible from contro-
versies in the courts." 49
The courts' extreme reluctance to recognize a cause of action
for educational malpractice, even in an arguably distinguishable
case, was illustrated by Hoffman v. Board of Education,SO handed
down by the New York Court of Appeals only six months after its
decision in Donohue. According to the court's own statement of
the facts in Hoffman, the plaintiff, Daniel Hoffman, had since
early childhood suffered from a serious speech defect of perhaps
psychosomatic origin owing to the death of his father during the
plaintiff's infancy. In September, 1956, Daniel was enrolled in kin-
dergarten in the New York City school system. Shortly thereaf-
ter, he had been tested by a certified clinical psychologist.
Although plaintiff's speech defect made this testing difficult, the
examining psychologist placed the plaintiff's intelligence quotient
(I.Q.) at seventy-four (74). Seventy-five (75) had been estab-
lished by the New York City Board of Education as the lower
limit demarcating children of normal intelligence from retarded
children. On this basis, Daniel was placed in a class for Children
of Retarded Mental Development (CRMD). The examining psy-
chologist had been uncertain of his findings, however, and in his
report had specified that Daniel (1) should receive speech ther-
apy and (2) should be "re-evaluated"5 ' within two years so that a
49. Id. at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378, quoting Bullock v. Cooley,
225 N.Y. 566, 576-77, 122 N.E. 630, 633 (1919).
50. 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979), rev'g 64 App. Div. 2d
369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
51. The exact meaning of the psychologist's recommendation of "re-evalua-
tion" was a source of disagreement not only between the plaintiff and the Board of
Education but also between the members of the Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion. The Board took the position that, through daily observation, it had been con-
tinuously re-evaluating the plaintiff and, thus, had complied with the
psychologist's recommendation. The psychologist, who testified for the plaintiff,
stated that he had meant that the child should be retested within two years and
that this had been standard procedure in such cases. The appellate majority, on
the basis of the expert testimony offered by both sides, adopted the position urged
by the plaintiff, i.e. that intelligence is determined only by LQ. testing. Hoffman v.
Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d at 377, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (1978). Mr. Justice Mar-
tuscello, however, found the examining psychologist's testimony so "incredible"
more accurate estimation of his intellectual abilities could be
made. No such retesting was ever undertaken. Daniel was placed
in classes for mentally retarded children, where he remained un-
til he was seventeen years old. At age seventeen he was trans-
ferred to an Occupational Training Center for the retarded,
where, at his mother's request, he was finally given a second in-
telligence test. His composite score was ninety-four (94). He was
then advised that he could no longer continue with his vocational
training because, being of normal intelligence, he was unqualified.
Hoffman then commenced an action against the New York
Board of Education, alleging that it had been negligent in its fail-
ure to retest his intelligence. This negligence had caused him to
be misclassified and improperly enrolled in the CRMD program
which, Hoffman alleged, had severely injured his emotional and
intellectual well-being and had reduced his ability to obtain em-
ployment. At trial, the jury awarded him damages in the amount
of $750,000.
A closely divided appellate court affirmed the trial judgment as
to liability, although it reversed the judgment as to damages and
would have required the plaintiff either to consent to a reduction
of the award to $500,000 or to retry the issue of damages. 5 2 The
thrust of the majority opinion was that the Board of Education's
failure to retest the plaintiff, in accordance with its own psycholo-
gist's recommendation, was an affirmative act of negligence and,
therefore, actionable.
Despite a variety of bases on which Hoffman might have been
distinguished from Donohue, the New York Court of Appeals re-
versed.53 At a very simple level the complexity and difficulty of
the issues presented in Hoffman was manifested by the fact that
the intermediate appellate court, the very same court that had
decided Donohue, divided three to two in affirming liability.54
that it should be discounted as a matter of law. In dissent, therefore, he adopted
the argument advanced by the Board, i.e. that the words "retest" and "re-evalu-
ate" were words of art with different meanings and, thus, that the Board had com-
plied with the psychologist's recommendation to "re-evaluate" the plaintiff within
two years. Id. at 381, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 111. Because it reversed for failure to state a
cause of action, the Court of Appeals did not address this issue. Hoffman v. Board
of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
52. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
53. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979).
54. While the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, did de-
cide both Donohue and Hoffman, the two cases were not heard by the same panel
of judges. Only one member of the court that decided Donohue sat in Hoffman,
Mr. Justice Damiani, and his position in the latter case was consistent with that
which he had taken in the former. In Donohue, Mr. Justice Damiani had been the
spokesman for the court in denying plaintiff's cause of action. In Hoffman, he dis-
756
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This was, in turn reversed by a four to three decision of the Court
of Appeals.55 A four-to-three reversal of a three-to-two decision
stands in marked contrast to the virtual unanimity of the courts
in true educational malpractice cases. This result strongly sug-
gests that reasonable minds might find Hoffman distinguishable
from those cases.
In contrast to Peter W. and Donohue, the plaintiffs complaint in
Hoffman was not that the board had failed to take steps to detect
and correct his academic deficiencies but that it had committed
affirmative acts of negligence.5 6 Also distinguishing Hoffman
from Donohue and Peter W. was the fact that in Hoffman the
school authorities had violated their own rules requiring retest-
ing. In Donohue and Peter W. the plaintiffs' claims failed, at least
in part, because of an inability to identify any legal duty that the
school authorities had breached. On the one hand, neither judi-
cial decision nor legislative provision could be found establishing
a duty to educate; on the other hand, it was necessary to permit a
certain discretion to the educators' professional judgment in de-
termining what pedagogical strategies to adopt and when and
whether to advance a student. In Hoffman, however, it was not
within the Board's discretion to prevent its own psychologist's
recommendations from being carried out. Violation of clear, self-
sented "because it is the public policy of this State that no cause of action exists
to recover for so-called educational malpractice." Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64
App. Div. 2d 369, 387, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 117 (1978). Indeed, Mr. Justice Damiani's
hands-off approach may represent the extreme position of judicial deference in
suits against the schools. Where educators are charged with negligence, Justice
Damiani would apparently deny recovery automatically. As a matter of law, the
difficulty with this approach is that it overlooks the negligent supervision cases.
See note 20 supra. The other dissenter in Hoffman, Mr. Justice Martruscello, did
not endorse Justice Damiani's theory but rather disagreed with the majority on
the facts. See note 51 supra.
55. Two members of the Court of Appeals, Justices Fuchsberg and Wachtler,
who voted to deny the cause of action in Donohue would have sustained Hoff-
man's right to recover. The third dissenter in Hoffman, Mr. Justice Meyer, did not
participate in Donohue. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 129, 400 N.E.2d
317, 321, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 380 (1979).
56. In analyzing educational malpractice claims, however, distinctions be-
tween misfeasance and nonfeasance may not be as helpful as they at first appear.
See note 13 supra. As dissenting Justice Damiani pointed out, the act of omitting
the retest could be seen as nonfeasance, whereas in Donohue the allegedly ineffec-
tive reading instruction could be characterized as misfeasance. Nevertheless, it
was on this ground that the majority of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
and the three dissenting members of the Court of Appeals would have dis-
tinguished Hoffrnan from Donohue. In point of fact, the complaints in both cases,
and in Peter W. as well, alleged acts both of omission and commission.
imposed guidelines presents a stronger case for the finding of
duty and breach than was present in either Donohue or Peter W.
Moreover, in Donohue and Peter W., any failure on the part of the
educational authorities to provide a positive program to remedy
the plaintiffs' ignorance left the plaintiffs no worse off than they
had been. Classifying Daniel as mentally retarded, however, im-
posed new and crippling burdens upon him. Thus, it could be ar-
gued, in Hoffman the duty, breach, causation, and injury were all
much clearer than in the earlier educational malpractice cases.5 7
It may even be incorrect to conceptualize Hoffman as an educa-
tional malpractice case. Arguably it is more closely analogous to
those cases imposing liability upon school authorities in the con-
text of remedial or special education programs.58 Furthermore, if
Hoffman is seen as an educational malpractice case, considera-
tions of public policy do not argue as strongly against the imposi-
tion of liability. The precedential impact of recognizing liability
on the facts in Hoffman would have been quite restricted, assum-
ing the probable infrequency of such misclassification.5 9
In spite of all such considerations, however, the New York
Court of Appeals dismissed Hoffman's suit for failure to state a
cause of action, simply reiterating its position in Donohue that a
cause of action for educational malpractice, "although quite possi-
bly cognizable under traditional notions of tort law, should not, as
a matter of public policy, be entertained by the courts .... "60
The majority explicitly conceded that, even were it to accept the
distinctions drawn by the lower courts it would not have decided
the case any differently.61
The adamant refusal of the judiciary to countenance a cause of
action for educational malpractice contrasts sharply with the en-
thusiasm of law review critics and commentators for recognizing
such an action.62 On grounds both of law and policy, however, the
courts' deference appears to be well-taken.
57. See Diamond, Education Law, 29 SYRACUSE L REV. 103, 147-52 (1978).
58. See Note, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy the Grow-
ing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SUFFoLK U. L. REV. 27, 32 (1979); see also
note 20 supra.
59. Of course, automatic promotion could be conceptualized as a form of mis-
classification. But the injury resulting from positive misclassification, as opposed
to the negative misclassification in Hoffinan, is considerably more speculative.
See notes 190-98 infra and accompanying text.
60. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 400 N.E.2d 317, 319, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1979).
61. Id. at 126, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
62. See notes 8 & 9 supra.
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III. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF EDUCATIONAL
MALPRACTICE LIAmBI Y
As the preceding discussion suggests, those who have sued for
educational malpractice have generally sought to hold educators
liable on a negligence theory, although misrepresentation has also
been pleaded. The lack of success that these claims have exper-
ienced has led others to attempt to construct a rationale for edu-
cational malpractice liability based either upon a contractual
relationship or a constitutional right. Closer analysis, however,
will reveal that each of these theories is unsatisfactory. Judicial
rejection of educational malpractice claims, therefore, has been
legally sound.
Contract
Of those theories advanced to support an educational malprac-
tice cause of action, perhaps the most easily dealt with is that
based on contract. The contractual relationship between student
and school has previously been recognized in suits against private
colleges and universities, 63 and some proponents of a cause of ac-
tion for educational malpractice have contended that, although
more plausible in the private school context, "[a] contract ap-
proach in a suit for failure to learn because of teacher negligence
or incompetence may have several advantages over a tort ap-
proach" even in the public school context.64 Among the perceived
advantages are: (1) the unavailability in contract of various de-
fenses that might bar recovery in tort; (2) the fact that govern-
mental immunity would be less likely to preclude recovery in
contract than in tort; (3) the generally longer statutes of limita-
tions applicable to contract actions;65 and (4) the wholly specula-
63. See note 20 supra; see also Note, supra note 15, at 401.
64. Comment, supra note 19, at 788. In point of fact, since tort liability has
been extended to virtually every type of contract misfeasance in the performance
of which may injure the promisee, the educational malpractice plaintiff would
have the option of suing in both tort and contract. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11,
at 617 nn. 47-56.
65. The period for bringing suit allowed by the statute of limitations might ac-
tually prove longer under a tort theory, however. Assuming that a cause of action
for educational malpractice were to be recognized, both Peter W. and Donohue
demonstrate that the plaintiff might not become aware of his injury until after
graduation from high school By analogy to the medical malpractice actions, the
appropriate rule would seem to be that the statute of limitations governing a tort
suit should not begin to run until the date of discovery of the injury. See, e.g.,
Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974) (defective tubal ligation). The stat-
tive possibility that courts would be more receptive to allowing
recovery for loss of an expectancy than they have so far proven to
be in suits based upon negligence theories.66
Among the more obvious defects of any contract-based theory
of recovery is the total absence of any bargained-for exchange.
Most jurisdictions require some negotiation for consideration.67
But, at least in the case of elementary school students, attend-
ance cannot constitute consideration because it is compulsory.68
The school, on the other hand, cannot refuse to accept the stu-
dent.69
Alternatively, an educational malpractice plaintiff might plead
promissory estoppel,70 arguing that, in reliance upon the public
school's implicit promise of non-negligent teaching, he or she sur-
rendered the opportunity of attending a private school. Such a
plaintiff, however, would then have the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she would and could
ute of limitations governing a contract action would begin to run from the moment
of breach.
66. From the point of view of those concerned with the impact upon public ed-
ucation of recognizing a cause of action for educational malpractice, contract-
based claims would have an additional advantage: the damage awards would be
considerably smaller than in tort. Under a contract theory, for example, damages
should be limited to the amount of benefit denied by the teacher, e.g., payment for
remedial instruction. Under a tort theory, plaintiffs recovery could be much
broader, e.g., loss of future earnings. Needless to say, this is not an "advantage"
widely proclaimed by the proponents of an educational malpractice cause of ac-
tion.
67. See E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAw 338-84 (2d ed.
1977).
68. See K. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 254-317. Every state except Alabama
has a compulsory education statute. From time to time these statutes have been
challenged by religious groups on the ground that compulsory attendance violates
their First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religion. The courts have
consistently rejected these challenges and sustained the constitutionality of com-
pulsory education. See, e.g., Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342
(1948); State v. Hershberger, 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955). In Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1974), an exception was created for the children of the
Amish, a tightly knit religious society of long history which permits its children to
attend public schools through the eighth grade but prefers to and does provide vo-
cational training at home after that point. Nothing in the Yoder opinion, however,
can be read as calling into question the continued validity of the general principle
that state-compelled school attendance is constitutionally permissible. But cf.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state-compelled attendance atpub-
lic schools held violative of due process). For further discussion of the compul-
sory education system, see Note, The Right to an Education: A Constitutional
Analysis, 44 U. CN. L. REv. 796, 799-803 (1975); Comment, The Rights of Children:
A Trust Mode A Child's Rights in the Compulsory Education System, 46 FoRD. L
REv. 669, 694-713 (1978). See also notes 157 & 158 infra and accompanying text.
69. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp.
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (school cannot
constitutionally exclude children, even though "uneducable").
70. See E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, supra note 67, at 384-424.
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have sought private education. The anomalous result would be to
make recovery in educational malpractice claims available only to
the children of relatively wealthy families (not generally the kind
of plaintiffs most education reformers have in mind) 71
The tenuous nature of the contract theories is demonstrated by
the fact that recovery under such a theory must rest upon an im-
plied term of an implied contract. To be sure, under the doctrine
of quasi-contract, courts have on occasion implied the existence
of a contractual obligation.7 2 Also courts have found certain
terms implied in some contracts,7 3 but those decisions have all in-
volved negotiated contracts, not contracts implied-in-law. In the
educational malpractice context, however, the court would first
have to imply a contract either between the teacher and the stu-
dent or between the school district and the student. Then it would
have to find that an implied term of this implied contract was a
promise of adequate and effective instruction. The willingness of
judges to engage in such contractual bootstrapping is at least sub-
ject to doubt.
More fundamentally, the doctrine of quasi-contract was created
to prevent unjust enrichment.7 4 Its application to education
would require a considerable leap of the judicial imagination, for
neither the teacher nor the school district is unjustly enriched by
a student's graduation lacking basic academic skills.
A slightly different contract theory on which a public school
student suing for a failure to learn might rely is that of the third
party beneficiary. 75 The contract of which the student would ar-
gue that he or she was the third party beneficiary might be either
the contract between the teacher and the school district, an im-
plied term of which was that the teacher would teach non-negli-
gently, or an implied contract between the taxpayers and the
school district (or the state), whereby the district promised to ed-
ucate the students committed to its care. In either case, the stu-
71. See Comment, supra note 19, at 785.
72. See E. MumHY & . SPEIDEL, supra note 67, at 428-30.
73. E.g., Lucas v. Haem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (acceptance of employment to render legal serv-
ices carries the implicit obligation to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as at-
torneys of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the
performance of the professional service they undertake). See also Arthur Murray,
Inc. v. Parns, 243 Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967).
74. E. MurnHY & T. SPEIDEL, supra note 67, at 428-33.
75. Id. at 1335-1411.
dent as third party beneficiary of the contract would be entitled to
recover for its breach. But the student would first have to show
that the contracting parties had manifested an "intent to benefit"
third parties,76 a difficult, perhaps insurmountable burden.
Even if the student could establish that he or she was a third
party for whose benefit the contract was made, relying on the con-
tract between the teacher and the school district would present
practical problems of recovery. Since the teacher's liability would
be for breach of contract and not for a tortious act, the Board of
Education probably would not be vicariously liable.77 But, if lia-
bility were to rest upon the teacher alone, the likelihood of any
substantial monetary recovery, given the pay scales of public
school teachers, seems remote indeed. Of course, the student
might be able to force the school district to dismiss the teacher, or
a court might order specific performance of the teacher's contrac-
tual promise to teach non-negligently. But these are hardly the
remedies that educational malpractice plaintiffs are seeking and
will, in fact, do such plaintiffs no good at all where the plaintiffs
have already graduated.7 8
Different but equally grave legal difficulties would attend any
attempt at third party enforcement of an implied contract be-
tween the school district (or the state) and the taxpayers. Most
jurisdictions take the position that, where a governmental agency
contracts to benefit the entire community, individuals do not have
a right to enforce that contract.7 9 It requires no feat of conceptual
prowess to conclude that, even were there an implied contract be-
tween the school district and its taxpayers, it is a contract in-
tended to benefit the entire community and not one on which the
district intended to be liable to the third party beneficiaries of the
contract.80 Therefore, under the accepted rule, an individual stu-
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133, comment d at 288 (Tent.
Drafts Nos. 1-7 1973).
77. See id.; see also Proehl, Tort Liability for Teachers, in T. ROADY & W. AN-
DERSEN, supra note 11, at 215-16.
78. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 19, at 758-60; Elson, supra note 9, at 642-47,
754-69.
79. See Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928) (a
member of the public may not maintain an action against a party that contracts
with the city to furnish water to the fire hydrants, in the absence of an apparent
intention on the part of the promisor to be liable to individual members of the
public as well as to the city for any loss resulting from a breach of the contract).
See also Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945); Riss v. City of
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). Moch was also
relied upon in Donohue to deny the existence of any duty on the part of the school
district under plaintiffs tort theory.
80. Of course, the question of whether a breaching promisor should be liable
to third party beneficiaries is essentially a matter of policy.
[T] he determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
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dent could not maintain an action to enforce the contract.
A final and perhaps fatal defect with contract-based theories of
recovery for educational malpractice is that the law of contracts
has historically been less flexible than the law of torts and less re-
ceptive to novel causes of action.81 Given the obstacles to bring-
ing a contract-based action, educational malpractice plaintiffs
must turn to other avenues of recovery.
Misrepresentation
A more promising approach for establishing a cause of action
for educational malpractice would seem to be to argue that, by
inaccurately representing a student's competence and educa-
tional progress, the school district or its teachers should be liable
in damages for misrepresentation.82 The lower court in Donohue
expressly declined to reach this issue,8 3 and the Peter W. court
dismissed plaintiff's intentional misrepresentation complaint as
improperly pleaded, having failed to aliege the requisite element
of reliance upon the asserted misrepresentation.84 This could be
construed to the effect that a properly pleaded complaint would
have survived.85
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm
to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the close-
ness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury,
and the policy of preventing future harm.
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 588, 364 P.2d 685, 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). So, as with the determination of duty under a tort
theory, resolution of the legal issues in educational malpractice claims must turn
upon fundamental policy considerations. As will be suggested, those policy con-
siderations are weighty against the recognition of a cause of action for educational
malpractice under whatever legal theory; see notes 228-319 infra and accompany-
ing text.
81. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
82. See Comment, supra note 19, at 782-84; Note, supra note 15, at 400-01; Com-
ment, supra note 14, at 132-35. See generally SYRACUSE UNIV. RESEARCH CORP., Su-
ING THE SCHOOLS FOR FRAuD (1973).
83. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist, 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 40, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 881. The Donohue court failed to reach the issue of misrepresenta-
tion because the plaintiff did not plead it; and the plaintiff did not raise the issue
for a very simple reason: He had received failing grades in several subjects and,
thus, had knowledge of at least some of his academic deficiencies.
84. See note 36 supra and accompanying text
85. See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 29, 44,
407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 885 (1978) (Suozzi, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 15, at 392;
Note, supra note 11, at 358 n.125. But see note 100 infra.
Liability for educational malpractice might be established
under either a negligent misrepresentation or an intentional mis-
representation theory. Once again, however, upon closer analysis
difficulties abound in establishing liability under either theory.
In order to establish a cause of action for negligent misrepre-
sentation, the educational malpractice plaintiff would have to
show that the defendant was under a duty to provide accurate
evaluations of a student's achievement, that the defendant had
breached this duty by failing to take reasonable care to ascertain
the truth as to the student's achievement and make that informa-
tion available, and that this breach was causally related to some
injury suffered by the plaintiff.86 In states having statutes requir-
ing school districts to keep parents and guardians informed of the
educational progress of their children, the necessary duty could
readily be found, since it cannot be assumed that the districts are
mandated to misinform.87 In those jurisdictions lacking such stat-
utes, the duty can probably be implied from the student-teacher-
parent relationship.88 But, as with attempts to base a cause of ac-
tion on an ordinary negligence theory, the plaintiff would have
difficulty in establishing that he or she has suffered any injury
cognizable by tort law.89 And, even if such injury could be estab-
lished, proof of causation would be an enormous stumbling block,
for many factors extraneous to schooling are causes of any partic-
ular student's failure to learn.90 Moreover, all of the defenses
available in an ordinary negligence action, such as contributory
negligence, would be good against a claim predicated on negligent
misrepresentation. Finally, misrepresentations of opinion, as op-
posed to misrepresentations of fact, are generally not recognized
as a basis for recovery.91 Given the extreme imprecision of grad-
ing, student progress reports, even including the granting of diplo-
86. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 684-86, 704-07.
87. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (West) (repealed 1975). Though re-
pealed in 1975, § 10759 had been in force at the time of the acts complained of in
Peter W.
88. "[W]here the representation, although itself gratuitous, is made in the
course of the defendant's business or professional relations, the duty is usually
found." W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 706. The duty has also been found in a pro-
spective contractual relationship; see Ultramares v. Touche Corp., 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931). Thus, linking the contractual theory with the misrepresentation
theory could produce a finding of duty. The argument, however, would be as tenu-
ous as it would be original.
89. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 823,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1976). Regarding the problem of establishing injury in an
educational malpractice action, see also notes 190-98 infra and accompanying text.
90. For a fuller discussion of causation in educational malpractice, see notes
199-227 inra and accompanying text.
91. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 721.
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mas, may be more accurately conceived of as expressions of
opinion rather than as statements of fact.
Under certain circumstances an educational malpractice cause
of action might lie for intentional misrepresentation. 92 But those
situations are likely to be extremely rare. Generally, therefore,
the hurdles awaiting an educational malpractice plaintiff attempt-
ing to plead successfully an intentional misrepresentation claim
will be even more difficult to surmount than those confronting a
negligent misrepresentation complaint. In the first place, the
plaintiff would have to prove an intent to deceive.93 This might be
the case where a teacher misrepresented a student's lack of abil-
ity to parents in order to preclude them from speaking to the
school administrators. But a good faith error on the teacher's part
in assessing the student's progress, while it might not avoid liabil-
ity for negligent misrepresentation, would be sufficient to dis-
prove any fraudulent intention.
Additionally, even where an intent to deceive is shown, educa-
tional malpractice plaintiffs will have to show (1) that they relied
upon the educator's misrepresentations, (2) that they had a right
to so rely, and (3) that the reliance was reasonable. 94 With re-
spect to their reliance, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that, but
for the misrepresentations, they would have changed their course
of action.95 Generally speaking, this would be done by showing
that, had it not been for the misleading reports, the parents would
have switched the student to a private school or provided private
tutoring. But, as previously noted, allowing recovery on such a
theory would permit relief only to those plaintiffs who need it
least.9 6 Moreover, as educational malpractice defendants are al-
most certain to point out, parents and guardians have or should
have an opportunity to judge for themselves whether their child
lacks even rudimentary reading and writing abilities, nor does
such judgment require any particular expertise.97 Therefore,
even where there has been deceitful intent and a factual misrep-
92. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 19, at 782 (postulating various hypothetical
fact situations which could give rise to an intentional misrepresentation action for
educational malpractice).
93. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 706.
94. Id. at 714-15.
95. Id.
96. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
97. Note the implication of this argument for the creation of a "professional"
standard of care in any educational malpractice action based upon a negligence
resentation, it is likely to be found to be immaterial. 98
For these reasons, even those critical of the courts' present pos-
ture in this area concede that misrepresentation theory "is proba-
bly not significant in educational malpractice cases." 99 Besides, it
is possible that the courts might refuse recognition to even a well-
pleaded misrepresentation complaint for the same reasons of
public policy on which they have relied in dismissing suits based
on ordinary negligence theories.100 After all, recognizing educa-
tional malpractice causes of action predicated on misrepresenta-
tion will not address the central concern of would-be educational
reformers. Permitting recovery for misrepresentation, either neg-
ligent or intentional, will not render the public school system any
better able to educate its students. At best, such awards would
simply encourage the system to be more honest about its inabil-
ity.1O'
Constitutional Right
As de Tocqueville observed, no major issue arises in American
politics that does not eventually resolve itself into a constitutional
controversy.10 2 It is not surprising, therefore, to find the advo-
cates of a cause of action for educational malpractice turning to
the Constitution, when defects are found in other of their theo-
ries.103 This is particularly inviting because, if the violation of a
theory. For a discussion of the "standard of care" problems, see notes 167-89 infra
and accompanying text.
98. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 720-21.
99. Comment, supra note 14, at 132. In a suit against a private school, how-
ever, a claim of either negligent or intentional misrepresentation would be much
more viable. Such a claim might be employed by parents in a suit to rescind their
contract with the school or as a defense in a suit by the school for the non-pay-
ment of tuition.
100. In fact, the Peter W. court did refuse to entertain the plaintiff's suit for neg-
ligent misrepresentation by relying upon the same policy arguments it had em-
ployed to dismiss the negligence cause of action. See note 35 supra and
accompanying text. In view of this, the court's refusal to address the intentional
misrepresentation claim, because improperly pleaded, may not stand for the prop-
osition that a properly pleaded action could withstand a motion to dismiss, as
some have so confidently predicted. See note 85 supra. It may stand for that prop-
osition, but it need not necessarily do so. Rather, if pressed, a court might reject a
properly pleaded intentional misrepresentation suit on policy grounds.
101. See Comment, supra note 14, at 143-44 Note, supra note 15, at 400-01. Both
the legal system and the school system should, of course, favor the promotion of
honesty. But, when this benefit is balanced against the potential costs attendant
upon the recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice, see notes
268-92 infra and accompanying text, this may well be an instance in which honesty
is not the best policy.
102. 1 A. DE TOcQUEVmLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 283-86 (P. Bradley trans.
1945).
103. E.g., Note, supra note 11, at 348; Comment, supra note 14, at 121-23; Note,
supra note 15, at 401-03.
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constitutional right could be found, it would render the educa-
tional authorities liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.104 But, first, some
constitutional right would have to be found. This task is rendered
considerably more difficult by the fact that no less an authority
than the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no
federal constitutional right to an education. 0 5
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court did indicate that, insofar as a state chose to pro-
vide public education, it must provide a minimally adequate edu-
cation. 06 But reliance upon this dictum to establish liability
under the Civil Rights Act would be misplaced. Rodriguez was a
class action seeking to enforce the equal protection clause. 0 7 The
minimum standard described in Rodriguez, thus, may not neces-
sarily be available to enforcement by an individual student. 08
Moreover, Rodriguez itself stands for the proposition that the
quality of instruction need not be absolutely equal. Finally, an ex-
amination of the facts in Rodriguez suggests that the acceptable
level of education the Court had in mind was minimal indeed.
For all these reasons, proponents of a cause of action for educa-
tional malpractice have not put much faith in equal protection ar-
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), a codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, states:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress....
The scope of liability of public entities and public officials under section 1983 has
been greatly expanded in recent years. See, e.g., Monnell v. New York City Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980), Maine v. Thiboutot, - U.S.--, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). This expansion of lia-
bility has been extended to school officials. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975).
105. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Several
state courts, however, have found that a right to education is established, explic-
itly or implicitly, by their state constitutions. E.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,
303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); In re Downey, 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340
N.Y.S.2d 687 (Farn. Ct. 1973); Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973);
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A-2d 359 (1977). The exist-
ence of such state-established rights, however, do not effect liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
106. 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
108. Comment, supra note 14, at 123.
guments.10 9
Alternatively, the due process clause may hold greater promise.
In the so-called "right to treatment" cases, involving persons in-
voluntarily committed to state institutions in civil proceedings,
the courts have held that, since the denial of liberty is for the ex-
press purpose of habilitation, the failure to provide treatment con-
stitutes a violation of due process.110 Arguing by analogy, the
advocates of a cause of action for educational malpractice contend
that the enforced confinement of public school students amounts
to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, unless ap-
propriate, non-negligent instruction is provided." This position
is strengthened by the fact that the concept of due process has
been held to govern certain aspects of the student-school relation-
ship."12
The courts have not proven receptive to the involuntary con-
finement theory, however. For example, in In re Gregory B., an
action for habitual truancy, the student-respondents defended by
arguing that their non-attendance was justified because the
school involved wasn't teaching them anything.1 3 To support
their allegation, they sought to compel the disclosure of various
school documents. In denying the discovery motion on the ground
that the information sought was immaterial and unnecessary, the
court briefly discussed the respondents' due process theory.1 4 It
postulated a set of hypothetical situations in which the inade-
quacy of the educational program might be tantamount to con-
finement in violation of due process. But, it continued, "we are
109. See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 402 n.115. The situation would be different,
were some students permitted to participate in remedial programs, while others
were denied such opportunity.
110. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally Ennis, The
Rights of Mental Patients, in THE RiGHrs OF AERICwANs 484 (N. Dorsen ed. 1970).
111. See Note, supra note 68, at 807-09; Comment, supra note 14, at 121-22; Note,
supra note 11, at 356-57.
112. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student's entitlement to public educa-
tion is a property interest such that suspension from public school requires pro-
ceeding consistent with due process); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (suspension of public school students for wearing
black armbands to protest Vietnam War violative of free speech and due process
guarantees). But cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (due process does not
require schools to provide notice and hearing prior to application of physical disci-
pline); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (since the state can substantively
limit the extent of an entitlement, it can also adopt procedural limitations). See
generally Alexander & Horton, Ingraham v. Wrighf" A Primer for Cruel and Unu-
sual Jurisprudence, 52 So. CAL. L. REV. 1305 (1979).
113. 88 Misc. 2d 313, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Fain. Ct. 1976).
114. Since the court expressly stated that it "need not reach this argument," id.
at 316, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 383, however, its discussion can only be considered as dicta.
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not here dealing with theoretical constructions. Nor do such hy-
pothetical examples . . . apply to the instant matter."" 5 Rather,
the court indicated, it must judge the matter within the context of
the actual operation of the New York City schools, and in that
context it found the analogy to the "right to treatment" cases to
be "improbable."" 6
Any attempt to sustain an educational malpractice claim on a
due process theory drawn from the "right to treatment" cases en-
counters several analytic difficulties. First, in order to establish a
right to be unconfined, the educational malpractice plaintiff would
have to show that compulsory school attendance constitutes con-
finement." 7 But the nature of the confinement, in any, is differ-
ent from that involved in the "right to treatment" cases. Unlike
mental patients, students are confined to the institution for only a
fraction of the school day, an even smaller fraction of the week,
and a far smaller fraction of the calendar year." 8 Moreover, in
the "right to treatment" cases, the evidence established that the
plaintiffs were receiving no treatment whatsoever." 9 Even in the
most inadequate school districts, however, students receive some
education. To effectively analogize compulsory school attendance
to the "right to treatment" cases, the educational malpractice
115. Id. at 317, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
116. Id. at 316, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
117. See Comment, supra note 68, at 703-04. The argument, moreover, would
apply only to students below the age of compulsory attendance. Students above
that age, generally secondary school students, could not argue that their "confine-
ment" was involuntary. They have the option not to attend. See also note 125 in-
fra.
118. Granting the ironic humor of an analogy between the public schools and
mental institutions, it may be that a more appropriate analogy would be one be-
tween the schools and the prisons. In neither case, however, are the schools the
kind of total institutions that are prisons and mental hospitals. This may account
in part for the schools' relative lack of success in modifying the behavior of their
inmates. See generally E. GOFFmAN, AsyLUms 1-125 (1961) (on the characteristics
of total institutions).
A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where
a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society
for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally ad-
ministered round of life.
Id. at xiii.
Interestingly enough, however, Goffman's emphasis, unlike that in the "right to
treatment" cases, is not upon the involuntary nature of the inmate role. By
Goffman's definition, thus, boarding schools might be seen as total institutions.
But day schools, public or private, could surely not be, given the availability to
students of concurrent alternative realities.
119. See note 110 supra.
plaintiff would have to show that the school was offering nothing
but a custodial service.
Even could such a demonstration be made, that would not nec-
essarily establish the analogy. The purpose of confinement of
public school students differs from that of mental patients. "Be-
cause the only constitutional justification for civilly committing a
mental retardate . . . is habilitation, it follows ineluctably that
once committed such a person is possessed of an inviolable con-
stitutional right to habilitation."120 But the justifications for com-
pulsory school attendance are neither as unidimensional nor
necessarily as altruistic.121 The state has the authority to expose
the child to education not only for the good of the child but also
for the good of the state.122 It may also be that simple custody is
a justification for the compulsory attendance laws. It is of note
that most of these statutes on their face do not require education,
only attendance.123
Yet another problem with analogizing the treatment cases to
education lies in the formulation of standards to judge the quality
of the education provided. This has presented the courts with no
difficulty in the "right to treatment" cases because, in the field of
mental health, "custodial care" and "treatment" are terms of art
with distinct and well-understood meanings. No such clarity ex-
ists in the education field as to the definition of a minimal educa-
tional standard.124 Furthermore, in mental health, fulfilling the
patient's right to treatment is accomplished by following particu-
lar procedures. It is not measured by the patient's progress in re-
lation to an externally defined goal or achievement level. This in
itself may render the whole body of "right to treatment" prece-
dent inapposite to educational malpractice litigation.
Even more fundamentally, the due process theory, as with mis-
representation arguments, is not directed toward the kind of re-
form which is the essential concern of those who advocate
educational malpractice as a cause of action. The reasoning of the
"right to treatment" cases may call into question the constitution-
ality of compulsory education laws.125 But these cases are not
120. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom. Wy-
att v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
121. In the confusion and debate over the institution's purpose, the schools
may, indeed, be more closely analogous to prisons than to mental hospitals; see
note 118 supra. See generally S. GRUPP, THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (1971).
122. See note 68 supra and notes 151 & 158 infra and accompanying text.
123. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 76 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20, § 911
(1964).
124. For further discussion of the difficulties involved in defining educational
standards, see notes 171-79 infra and accompanying text.
125. Were a suit for educational malpractice premised on an involuntary con-
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precedent for those who would hold the schools accountable for
children's failure to learn or force the schools to provide an "ade-
quate" or "better" education. It may well be that compulsory edu-
cation should be abandoned. But that is an entirely different
argument than the one which those who would recognize an edu-
cational malpractice cause of action are seeking to make.
Negligence
Because constitutional theory, like contract and misrepresenta-
tion, has proven inadequate to support the desired cause of ac-
tion, educational reformers have tended to place their emphasis
where they began, with common law negligence. But here, too,
creating liability for educational malpractice would require an un-
justified extension or distortion of present doctrine. As Peter W.,
Donohue, and Hoffman eloquently testify, the principal difficulty
has lain in finding any legally cognizable duty of care owed by ed-
ucators to their students. But, even were such a duty to be dis-
covered, educational malpractice advocates would yet experience
numerous and substantial difficulties in (1) defining the appropri-
ate standard of care to differentiate educational malpractice from
appropriate practice, (2) establishing causation, and (3) proving
the existence of any compensable injury.
Duty. There can be no recovery for negligence unless there is a
legal basis for imposing a duty of due care upon the defendant.12 6
A plaintiff seeking recognition of an educational malpractice
claim, therefore, would first have to convince a court that the edu-
cator had a duty to provide competent instruction. The difficulties
which the educational malpractice plaintiff faces in this regard
are well illustrated by Peter W. The plaintiff in Peter W. argued
that his enrollment in the schools established a duty of care in
the school district under one or more of the following theories:
(1) that, by assuming the function of instruction, the school dis-
trict had assumed a concomitant duty to exercise reasonable care
in discharging that function; (2) that the nature of the relation-
finement-due process theory to succeed, depending upon the exact reasoning of
the court, a state seeking to limit the liability of itself, its school districts, and its
teachers might (1) decrease the number of hours in the school day, (2) lower the
compulsory attendance age, or (3) repeal the compulsory attendance laws.
126. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.RCo., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Cardozo,
c.J.).
ship between teachers and students created a duty to exercise
reasonable care; and (3) that a duty to exercise reasonable care in
carrying out the function of academic instruction was statutorily
recognized in California. The precedent relied upon by the plain-
tiff in each of these arguments was dismissed almost summarily
as inapplicable. 127
Two possible origins of a duty to use reasonable care in instruc-
tion have been advanced: common law principles and statutory
enactments. 28 The first theory suffers from the fact that there ex-
ists no direct precedent for a common law duty. Nevertheless, ar-
guments by analogy abound.
The first of these, the theory of an undertaking, draws support
from the common law of rescue.129 Both Prosser and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts assert that when one undertakes to
render a service to another upon which that other relies, the actor
assumes a duty to act non-negligently and will be liable for any
harm that results from negligent performance. 130 Just as there is
no duty requiring a school system to educate, there is no duty at
common law to rescue another in peril. An attempted rescue,
however, may create liability. "Where performance clearly has
been begun, there is no doubt that there is a duty of care."131 The
rescuer need not succeed, but he must act reasonably under the
circumstances. Similarly, it is argued, the school system and its
teachers incur a duty to educate.132 The uneducated child is like
a potential victim in need of rescue. When the schools undertake
the attempt to educate this child, though they need not succeed,
they do assume a duty to make the attempt non-negligently. If
educational alternatives are available and the school negligently
fails to utilize them, it has not acted reasonably under the circum-
stances and should be liable in tort. This argument is further but-
tressed by the fact that the general principle of voluntary
assumption of duty has been applied specifically to government
127. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861, distinguishing Lau v.
Nicholas, 414 U.S. 563 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 5 CaL 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487
P.2d 1241 (1971); Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d 360 (1970).
128. For a discussion of the "duty" concept by those favoring a cause of action
for educational malpractice, see Comment, supra note 8, at 564-72; Note, supra
note 58, at 33-41; Note, supra note 15, at 393-96; Comment, supra note 14, at 118-30;
Elson, supra note 9, at 693-97; Comment, supra note 19, at 767-81.
129. See Note, supra note 15, at 398 n.92. See generally J. RATCLiF, THE GOOD
SALArrAN AND THE LAw (1966).
130. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 343-48; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 323 & comment e at 139 (1965).
131. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 346.
132. See Note, supra note 15, at 398 n.92.
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undertakings in several cases. 133
The undertaking theory, however, normally requires the plain-
tiff's reliance on the defendant's affirmative actions,13 4 and the dif-
ficulties of establishing reliance in educational malpractice
actions have already been noted. 3 5 Moreover, unlike the under-
takings in the cases applying the voluntary assumption of duty
theory to government actions, a school district's provision of edu-
cation is not discretionary or voluntary, but mandatory. Perhaps
the state, as creator of the educational system, might be liable
under this theory. But the cases will not support liability for
school districts or for individual teachers. Finally, the educational
malpractice plaintiff seeking to establish duty on an undertaking
theory must confront the fact that the courts have been reluctant
to apply the undertaking theory where the undertaking in ques-
tion was the provision of some broad social service.136
A second line of argument to establish a common law duty to
educate proceeds from the school's duty of care for the physical
safety of its students while at school.137 So far, this is the only
clearly recognized tort duty which a school system has towards
its students. There is, however, a strong countervailing reason for
not extending the educator's duty by this analogy. When a school
district or its teachers are charged with a duty to act non-negli-
gently in supervising the physical safety of the students, they are
held to the traditional reasonable person standard.138 The educa-
tional malpractice plaintiff, however, is seeking to hold educators
to a higher standard of care, a professional or "reasonable
teacher" standard.3 9 Even the advocates of an educational mal-
133. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (discretionary opera-
tion of lighthouse); Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr.
508 (1964) (gratuitous promise by sheriff to warn plaintiff of release of dangerous
prisoner); Conelly v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1970) (negligent
preparation and release of weather and flood information).
134. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 347.
135. See notes 94-98 supra and accompanying text.
136. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928) (Cardozo,
C.J.) (suit for negligent failure to provide adequate water to extinguish a fire
before it destroyed plaintiff's warehouse not maintainable as an action for a com-
mon law tort). Moch is not followed in at least one jurisdiction; see Doyle v. South
Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964). See also note 79 supra.
137. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 566-67. For further discussion of the
cases involving physical injury to students and their reception in educational mal-
practice actions, see note 20 supra.
138. See note 20 supra; see generally W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 149-66.
139. The appropriate standard of care, therefore, is one factor to consider in de-
practice cause of action, therefore, concede that the "basic dis-
tinction between standards of care applicable to physical
supervision and academic instruction significantly weakens any
attempt to analogize the two" and leaves this line of argument
"without a solid logical basis."14o
The third theory for the creation of a common law duty of non-
negligent academic instruction rests on an analogy to the profes-
sional malpractice actions.141 This, assert the commentators, is
"ft]he strongest legal argument for recognition of an educator's
duty to provide competent academic instruction ... ."142 Even
so, it is not all that strong, for it rests upon the unarticulated
premise that public school educators are, in fact, professionals.
To be sure, that is how public school teachers characterize them-
selves.143 But self-characterization by an occupational group
should not be legally dispositive. Could physicians escape profes-
sional liability if the American Medical Association were to uni-
laterally reclassify medicine as a trade?
Upon analysis it appears that there is reason to doubt the pro-
fessionalism of public school educators, at least in any legally
meaningful sense. Sociological studies of the "professions" nor-
mally exclude education because it fails to meet various criteria
of professionalism.'" By occupation, the professional holds him-
self or herself out as possessing certain skills and special knowl-
edge secured by arduous post-graduate education; as a
consequence, persons who utilize those services have a right to
expect the professional to use that skill and knowledge with some
minimum degree of competence.145 The public school teacher, by
contrast, possesses no well-defined technical knowledge compara-
ble to that of a legal or medical professional. To the extent that
educators hold themselves out as possessing any special skills or
knowledge, it is knowledge in a particular substantive area (e.g.,
termining whether a duty exists; judicial consideration of these two elements,
thus, does not actually proceed in two separate and distinct phases. Regarding the
standard of care, see notes 167-89 infra and accompanying text.
140. Comment, supra note 8, at 567.
141. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 161-65. Technically, it is accurate to
speak of "malpractice" only where the object of the negligence action is to hold
the professional defendant liable as a professional. It follows that the professional
standard of care is applicable only once a professional duty has been established.
142. Comment, supra note 8, at 567.
143. See, e.g., Saretsky, The Strangely Significant Case of Peter Doe, 54 Pm
DELTA KAPPAN 589, 592 (1973).
144. See, e.g., D. LORTIE, ScHooL TEACHER: A SocIOLOGIcAL STUDY (1975); W.
MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 5-6 (1970); Goode, The Theoretical
Limits of Professionalization, in THE SEm-PRoFssioNS AND THEIm ORGANMZATIONS
266, 277-78 (A. Etzioni ed. 1969); Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70
Ari. J. Soc. 137 (1964).
145. See T. ROADY & W. ANDERSEN, supra note 11.
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biology, history) and not with respect to the process of education
per se.14 The professional relies primarily upon status and repu-
tation to determine earning capacity. The public school teacher
receives an annual wage according to a salary schedule deter-
mined by an external authority. Indeed, society does not accord
high social status to teachers precisely because it perceives that
the knowledge possessed by educators is readily comprehensible
by laypersons, unlike medical or legal knowledge.14 7 In short,
public school teachers are at best aspiring semi-professionals.14 8
Therefore, the application of the professional negligence cases to
this occupational group, in order to create a duty of care to edu-
cate, would be inappropriate.
Unfortunately for the advocates of an educational malpractice
cause of action, arguments that statutory or constitutional provi-
146. This tendency is, of course, more pronounced as one moves up the educa-
tional hierachy. Perhaps a political science professor might be held liable for
political science malpractice, assuming that an appropriate standard of care could
be developed. But to hold the same professor liable for educational malpractice is
a different matter. On the other hand, the advocates of a cause of action for educa-
tional malpractice are not seeking to hold the second grade teacher liable for arith-
metic malpractice.
147. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (general public believes that laypeople can teach or at
least offer valuable advice to educators on appropriate teaching methods). Even
though there is widespread agreement about the utility of education, it is this pub-
lic perception of the level of knowledge necessary to teach effectively that nega-
tively affects the status of educators. W. MOORE, supra note 144, at 235. See also
note 172 infra and accompanying text.
148. Marcus, School Teachers and Militant Conservatism, in THE PROFESSIONS
AND THEm PROSPEcTs 191 (R. Friedson ed. 1971); W. MOORE, supra note 144, at 73.
Candor compels the admission that the courts have not entirely subscribed to
this line of reasoning. See, e.g., McGrath v. Burkhard, 131 Cal. App. 2d 367, 376, 280
P.2d 864, 870 (1955) (imposition of extracurricular duties permissible because of
professional nature of teacher's- position); District 300 Educ. Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 31 Ill. App. 3d 550, 554, 334 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1975) (teacher's professional sta-
tus not demeaned by assignment of extracurricular duties); McCullough v. Cash-
mere School Dist., 15 Wash. App. 730, 734, 551 P.2d 1046, 1050 (1976) (contract offer
must reflect educator's education, experience, and professional preparation). In
according teachers professional status, the McGrath court was also influenced by
the fact that they received an annual wage, rather than an hourly rate like a la-
borer. It should be noted, however, that many of these factors will support a con-
trary conclusion. Doctors, lawyers, and psychiatrists, for example, customarily bill
by the hour; and, while it may be argued whether the performance of extracurricu-
lar duties, e.g., monitoring the students' lunch hour, is demeaning, it is difficult to
conceive of true professionals performing them. A physician monitoring hospital
patients' meals? Cf. Hoose v. Drumm, 281 N.Y. 54, 57-58, 22 N.E.2d 233, 234 (1939)
(teacher required to meet the standard of care to be expected of an ordinary, pru-
dent parent under the circumstances).
sions dealing with education create a duty of care in academic in-
struction have fared even less favorably at the hands of the courts
than have efforts to create a common law duty. Thus, in Donohue,
the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged the possibility of a
common law duty but abruptly rejected the idea that there ex-
isted any statutory duty to educate. 49 Similarly, in Peter W., the
plaintiff invoked various provisions of both the Education and
Government Codes, 50 but the California court held that these
statutes were merely "directed to the attainment of optimum edu-
cational results, . .. not as safeguards against 'injury'. .. ,,151
The principal difficulty with creating a statutory duty of due
care in academic instruction lies in the breadth and generality of
the legislative mandates involved.152 Generally, a statutory duty
exists only where the underlying purpose of the statute is the
protection of individuals from injury of a particular type. 5 3 The
statute usually prohibits or commands particular actions in spe-
cific situations and will be applicable only if the plaintiff is a
member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the
statute and if the injury suffered is of a type covered by the stat-
ute.154 State statutory and constitutional provisions relating to
149. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979). The trial and appellate courts in
Donohue had dismissed the plaintiffs statutory claim with equal dispatch. 95
Misc. 2d 1, 2, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (1977); 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 37-38, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874,
880 (1978).
150. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (West) (repealed 1975) (requiring school district
to keep parents informed as to the educational progress of the child); CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 12154 (reorganized as § 12101) (West 1977) (mandating compulsory full-
time education); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8573.(reorganized as § 51255) (West 1978) (for-
bidding school district from granting a diploma unless certain standards of profi-
ciency are met); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8505 (reorganized as § 51204) (West 1978)
(requiring that school districts design courses to meet the needs of its pupils).
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980) provides:
Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enact-
ment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of in-
jury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately
caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity estab-
lishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.
See generally E. KuNzi, Tie CA ORNmiA EDUCATION CODE (1978).
151. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 862.
152. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189:10 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-1.1(4)
(1977); MASS. AiM. LAws ch. 76, § 1 (Supp. 1975). Were a statutory duty of due
care in academic instruction to be recognized, the content of that duty would, of
course, vary from one state to another, depending upon the wording and history of
the state's education laws. See Note, supra note 11, at 344; Comment, supra note
14, at 127-30.
153. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, 190-97.
154. Id. But see Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485
(1953) (allowing individual recovery for breach of a statute intended to benefit the
public at large); Foley v. New York, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945) (interpreting
public nuisance statute as intended to confer individual protection).
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education are, thus, not of a type normally thought to create a tort
duty. They merely require the creation and maintenance of public
school systems. They are not intended to protect individual chil-
dren against the injury of non-education but instead are designed
to promote the general welfare through the development of a lit-
erate and productive population.155
This conclusion is further strengthened by the historical back-
ground of the education laws.1 56 The free public school move-
ment was a product of the industrial revolution, a social and
economic phenomenon that, among other things, created a de-
mand for an educational system that would train people to ade-
quately perform complex tasks. This need was eventually filled
by state and local government through the provision of a compul-
sory, tax-supported, public school system. From its earliest begin-
nings, therefore, the purpose of the free public school movement
was to confer the benefit of education upon the general populace.
In fact, far from creating a right to education for the benefit of
the individual student, the compulsory attendance laws-rightly
understood-actually appear to argue against the existence of
such a right. The justification for the compulsory education laws
lies in the recognition of the parent's duty to educate the child,
not for the benefit of the child, but for the benefit of the state,157
and at least one state supreme court has squarely so held.158
Since a right would seem to belong to the party with the power to
enforce it, it must follow that the right to education belongs to the
state as representative of the general public.1 59
Alternatively, a duty of educating a student to a certain re-
quired minimum level of proficiency might be found in statutes or
155. Contra Comment, supra note 19, at 780 (education statutes are designed to
benefit a particular class, school-age children, rather than the general public).
156. See J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1
(1974); Koenig, The Law and Education in Historical Perspective, in THE COURTS
A EDUCATION 1, 10 (C. Hooker ed. 1978).
157. "One of the most important natural duties of the parent is the obligation to
educate his child, and this duty he owes not to the child only, but to the common-
wealth." State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 329, 61 N.E. 730, 732 (1901).
158. Fogg v. Board of Educ., 76 N.H. 296, 299, 82 A. 173, 174-75 (1912) ("the pro-
motion of the general intelligence of ... the body politic" held to be the primary
purpose for maintaining the public school system). See also notes 68 & 117-23
supra and accompanying text.
159. But cf. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874 (D.D.C. 1972) ('requir-
ing parents to see that their children attend school under pain of criminal penal-
ties presupposes that an educational opportunity will be made available to the
children").
regulations mandating specific actions in defined situations in-
volving students with identifiable learning problems. 160 Such
statutes or regulations do focus upon individual student needs
and do address specific educational problems. But to hold educa-
tors liable for procedural violations does not necessitate liability
for negligent academic instruction; nor are such statutes neces-
sarily intended to permit private causes of action. To date, there-
fore, the courts have not been receptive to the use of such
statutes or regulations to create a new tort duty.161
Ultimately, as the court recognized in Peter W.,162 whether or
not the law will find that a particular duty of care is owed by one
to another is a matter of policy. 163 There is no universal, certain
test for establishing duty. The courts can find it where they
choose to do so, and can as easily refuse to find it.164 The plain-
tiffs interest in legal protection must be balanced against compet-
ing policy claims.165
Judicial recognition of the existence of a duty of care is dependent upon
principles of sound public policy and involves the consideration of numer-
ous relevant factors which include, inter alia: ... the degree to which the
courts should be involved in the regulation of [the relationship between
the parties] and the social utility of the activity out of which the alleged
injury arises; ...the degree of certainty that the alleged injuries were
160. See Comment, supra note 8, at 569-71, 596.
161. See Doe v. Board of Educ., No. 48277 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Md.
July 6, 1979), reported in Comment, supra note 8, at nn.1, 3, & 60-63 and accompa-
nying text. See also Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979), rev'g, 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the United States Supreme Court did im-
plicitly recognize a state commitment to provide a meaningful education, holding
that non-English-speaking students who were denied compensatory language in-
struction had been foreclosed from a meaningful education in violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See also Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279
(D. N.M. 1972). But the recognition of a duty to provide education was implicit
only; and, as even the proponents of educational malpractice concede, Lau is "dis-
tinguishable from the educational malpractice suit." Comment, supra note 14, at
126. It involved a class action brought by a minority group suing under clear statu-
tory language and not the creation of a new cause of action on judicial authority
alone.
162. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
163. As Prosser states:
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question-
whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant's conduct .... It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion,
rather than an aid to analysis in itself .... [I]t should be recognized that
"duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expresion of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection.
W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 325-26 (footnotes omitted).
164. See, e.g., Prosser, Pasgraf Revisited, 52 MIcH. L, REv. 1 (1953); Seavey, Mr.
Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REv. 372 (1939).
165. Discussion of whether those competing policy considerations augur
against recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice is reserved, see
notes 228-319 infra and accompanying text.
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proximately caused by the defendant... ; economic considerations, which
include the ability of the defendant to respond in damages; and adminis-
trative considerations, which concern the ability of the courts to cope with
a flood of new litigation, the probability of feigned claims and the difficul-
ties inherent in proving the plaintiff's case.166
Standard of care. Also relevant is the degree to which reason-
able people can agree as to the proper course to be followed to
prevent injury. Yet this, too, presents a problem in framing a
cause of action for educational malpractice on a negligence the-
ory, the inability to define an appropriate standard of care.
Were a legal duty of care to be recognized in educational mal-
practice cases, the courts would then have to establish a standard
by which to determine whether that duty had been breached. De-
pending upon the origin of the duty,167 the choice would be be-
tween imposing a reasonable person or a professional standard of
care.168
In educational malpractice actions, however, a reasonable per-
son standard of care would be unsatisfactory. True, this is the
standard to which teachers have been held in the negligent super-
vision cases. 169 But supervising the physical activities of children
is a responsibility frequently experienced by members of the gen-
eral public and easily understood by jurors. Allegations of incom-
petent pedagogy, by contrast, would probably involve expert
testimony proffered by both sides. In such cases, use of a reason-
able person standard of care would involve the danger of arbi-
trary jury verdicts. Such considerations have influenced even
those favorably disposed to an educational malpractice cause of
action to argue that "adaptation of a reasonable person standard
to the area of academic instruction is questionable."170
A professional standard of care would be more protective of the
166. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 35, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978) (court's emphasis), afOd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
167. Regarding the interrelationship between the concept of duty and the stan-
dard of care, see note 139 supra and accompanying text. Recognition of a statutory
duty would imply its own unique standard of care defined by the requirements of
the statute on which the duty was predicated. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566
(1974) (state imposed standard of proficiency in English for high school gradua-
tion requires compensatory language instruction for non-English-speaking pupils).
168. Discussions of the appropriate standard of care by those in favor of an ed-
ucational malpractice cause of action may be found in Comment, supra note 8, at
572-79; Comment, supra note 14, at 126-27.
169. See note 10 supra.
170. Comment, supra note 8, at 573.
educator.' 7 ' But, in view of the abstract quality of education and
the existence of numerous and conflicting theories of learning,
formulation of a judicially manageable standard of professional
care is unlikely if not impossible.172 In medical malpractice cases,
the standard of care required is that of the level of skill and
knowledge common to members of the profession in good stand-
ing, and practical in the community.? 3 In education, creation of a
workable standard of ordinary care and skill is confounded by the
lack of established goals in the field and the widespread disagree-
ment among educators as to the appropriate response to any par-
ticular, practical pedagogic problem.174 Indeed, educators cannot
even agree as to the primary goal of education. Some argue that it
is to teach basic skills;175 others maintain that it is to socialize
students; 7 6 and still others contend that it is to develop creative
mental capacity.177 Not surprisingly, there is no consensus about
how best to teach or how to measure what has been taught.? 8 In
a medical malpractice action, an expert can testify as to the cor-
rect and accepted standard that the physician should have fol-
lowed. No expert could testify to a similar standard in education.
In this regard, the exasperated, albeit correct, remarks of the
court in Otero v. Mesa County Valley School District, No. 51, are of
note:
Certainly, if the expert testimony proved anything, it proved that educa-
tional theory is not an exact science, and an expert can be found who will
testify to almost anything. Listening to these experts causes one to con-
clude that if psychiatrists' disagreements are to be compared to differ-
ences between educators, psychiatrists are almost of a single mind.179
Besides, even if some conventional educational methods could
be discovered, or at least methods adopted by a substantial por-
tion of the education community, mere deviation from these con-
ventional methods should not be construed as negligence. Such a
171. See generally T. RoADY & W. ANDERSEN, supra note 11.
172. But cf. Elson, supra note 9, at 679-93 (discussing justiciability of standards
for deciding issues of educational negligence). Given the symbiotic relation be-
tween the duty concept and the standard of care, see note 139 supra, this is itself
an argument against the creation of a duty to educate on the basis of the educa-
tor's alleged professional status.
173. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L REV. 549
(1959); W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 162.
174. See Shanker, Dangers in the "Educational Malpractice" Concept, AmERI-
CAN TEACHER 4 (June 1975). The implications of this lack of consensus for judicial
intervention or non-intervention in the establishment of education policy are ex-




178. See P. STICKLAND, J. PBHiLPS & W. PHILLipS, supra note 4.
179. 408 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Colo. 1975), vacated on procedural grounds, 568
F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1978).
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stultified position would discourage experimentation and restrict
the development of better teaching methods. In fact, under cer-
tain circumstances, requiring a teacher to follow a particular
methodology may present constitutional problems.180
Student performance on standardized achievement tests has
been suggested as a measure of teacher competence. But
achievement test scores are notoriously inadequate measures.' 8 '
Even were they not, mere poor performance on achievement tests
would be insufficient to establish educational malpractice, absent
proof of some other negligent conduct on the part of the teacher,
for the causes of non-learning are numerous. 182
Moreover, any attempt to establish an acceptable standard of
care by which to measure educational malpractice allegations
must confront the problem of identifying the appropriate commu-
nity whose standard will be used. "In a suit to recover for a stu-
dent's failure to learn because of teacher negligence, the standard
of acceptable instruction should be comparative, that is, the level
of skill and learning of the minimally acceptable teacher in the
same or similar communities." 8 3 But what is to be the commu-
nity? If the standard against which the performance of ghetto
schools and their teachers are evaluated is to be that of other
ghetto schools and teachers, a majority of ghetto schools and
teachers will, by definition, meet the communal standard of care.
But the utility of educational malpractice actions as a vehicle for
improving the quality of these schools will be seriously under-
mined. Use of a more inclusive community standard, however,
could impose unrealistic, even unattainable, performance expec-
tations upon these educators. The result would be an unfair im-
position of liability that would further discourage the qualified
from teaching in these schools. Again, the educational malprac-
tice action as a means to improve educational quality would be
self-defeating.
"The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with different and
180. Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa
1972).
181. Scheelaase v. Woodbury Central Community School Dist., 488 F.2d 237, 244
(8th Cir. 1973) (Bright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). See also
Goodman, Testing in Reading: A General Critique, in AccoNTn ILrrY AND READ-
ING INSTRUCTION 22 (1973) (detailing inadequacies of reading tests).
182. For a discussion of the problem of determining causation in educational
malpractice actions, see notes 199-227 infra and accompanying text.
183. Comment, supra note 19, at 771.
conflicting theories of how and what a child should be taught," ob-
served the Peter W. court. 8 4 Influenced by this consideration, the
courts that have been presented with educational malpractice
claims have tended to move with great caution. Both the Califor-
nia court in Peter W. and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, in Donohue held that, in a suit for educational negli-
gence, a workable standard of care was simply inconceivable. 185
The New York Court of Appeals, however, while affirming the Ap-
pellate Division's holding in Donohue, stated, "Nor would creation
of a standard with which to judge an educator's performance of
that duty necessarily pose an insurmountable obstacle."' 86
The judiciary's experience in the education finance cases sug-
gests that the New York court's optimism is unwarranted.187 In
the public school financing area, the courts have experienced
grave difficulties in arriving at an ascertainable standard by which
to identify what an adequate education is, much less how it can
be achieved.188 The history of the courts' handling of the school
finance issue teaches not that the courts cannot
decide issues concerning the quality of educational services. Rather, its
lesson is that courts should be wary of determining what an adequate or
minimum quality education requires, since there is no empirical evidence,
no agreement among practitioners or experts, no social or moral consen-
sus, and no commonsense rationale that a court can use, without serious
reservation or qualification, to define what constitutes adequate or mini-
mum quality educational services.1
89
It is a lesson with negative implications for the recognition of a
cause of action for educational malpractice.
Injury. In addition to establishing a duty of care and a breach
of that duty, a plaintiff in negligence must show that he or she has
suffered a legally compensable injury.S0 Commentators favoring
a cause of action for educational malpractice have tended to leap
184. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (1976).
185. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861; Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 33-34, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878-79 (1978).
186. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979).
187. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971); 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
907 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973); 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973); 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975); 67 NJ. 333, 339
A.2d 193 (1975); 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976); 70
N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
188. Coons, Recent Trends in Science Fiction: Serrano Among the People of
Number, in EDUcATIoN, Socr4 ScIENcE AND THE JuDicLur PROCESS 60 (R. Rist & R.
Anson eds. 1977); Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case Study in Judicial Self-Legi-
timization, 8 RuT.-CAM. L. J. 508 (1977).
189. Elson, supra note 9, at 689.
190. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 848, 902 (1965).
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this analytic barrier by simple assumption.191 But defining his or
her injury in a legally cognizable fashion presents the educational
malpractice plaintiff with a problem at least as intractable as that
of establishing duty or fixing the standard of care.
The virtual unanimity of the courts in denying that any harm
incurred by educational negligence conforms to the accepted un-
derstanding of tortious injury stands in stark contrast to the com-
mentators' confidence. In Peter W., for example, the court found
"no reasonable 'degree of certainty that... plaintiff suffered in-
jury' within the meaning of the law of negligence."192 This lan-
guage was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, in Donohue which went on to add that the law was "not
intended to protect against the 'injury' of ignorance, for every in-
dividual is born lacking knowledge, education and experience."193
According to this reasoning, the failure to teach has left the edu-
cational malpractice plaintiff no worse off when he left school
than when he entered. As the court wrote in rejecting Gregory
B.'s claim that he had been unconstitutionally confined because
the education offered him had been inadequate:
How is such 'inadequacy" to be measured? Against the inadequacy of
nothing, that is to say, not going to school?... [A] Court may reasonably
assume that a student, even in a school which falls below the median...
is educationally better served than without an education at all. 9 4
The principal difficulties attending the recognition of educa-
tional deficiency as a tort injury are two-fold. First, the educa-
tional malpractice plaintiff has lost an expectancy interest or
failed to receive a benefit. But the law of tort does not generally
compensate for lost expectancies or benefits.195 In Moch v. Rens-
191. E.g., Note, supra note 58, at 48 ("hat plaintiffs suffer harm ... is indispu-
table ... ."); Comment, supra note 14, at 118 ('This Comment builds upon the
premise that an inability to read or write at an adequate level constitutes an in-
jury.") For a more careful analysis of injury by a commentator favoring a cause of
action for educational malpractice, see Comment, supra note 8, at 579-82.
192. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (1976).
193. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 31-32, 35-
36, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878, 880 (1978). See also Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App.
Div. 2d 369, 388-89, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 118 (1978) (Damiani, J., dissenting).
194. In re Gregory B., 88 Misc. 2d 313, 317-18, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380, 384 (Fain. Ct.
1976) (emphasis in the original). Cf. also Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d
689 (1967) (denying recovery for "wrongful life").
195. But see Lucas v. Hanm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961)
(allowing recovery for benefits plaintiff probably would have received, had it not
been for attorney malpractice).
selaer Water Co., for example, Judge Cardozo held that a munici-
pal contractor's failure to furnish a supply of water adequate to
fight a fire amounted to the denial of a benefit and not the com-
mission of a legal wrong.196 In other words, it was not an injury at
all. The situation of a student who fails to learn because of
teacher negligence would be closely analogous.
Second, calculation of damages for non-learning would be al-
most impossible. In the very apposite case of Sioux Tribe v.
United States, the United States Court of Claims recognized that
Indian children who had been denied educational benefits which
the government should have provided under the terms of a treaty,
had suffered a substantial loss.197 But the court denied recovery
because the monetary value of the loss could not be calculated
with sufficient certainty. If the educational malpractice plaintiffs
claim is that he has suffered psychological harm in terms of low-
ered self-esteem, the value of literacy to an individual is so highly
personal as to be speculative.198 On the other hand, if the claim is
one for loss of prospective wages, the plaintiff is again asserting a
mere expectation, the loss of a possible economic advantage. Ed-
ucation to a particular level does not and cannot assure a certain
level of income. The inability of the educational malpractice plain-
tiff to assert an injury cognizable at law, thus, remains fatal to rec-
ognition of the cause of action.
Causation. Even were it possible for the educational malprac-
tice plaintiff to conform his or her claim to negligence law's model
of duty, standard of care, and injury, the largest hurdle of all
would still await-establishing a causal link between the negli-
gent education and his or her own failure to learn.199 The courts'
196. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
197. 84 Ct. CL 16 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 740 (1937).
198. But see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 738, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)
(allowing recovery for psychological damages in the absence of accompanying
physical injury). Dillion, however, has not been overwhelmingly endorsed by
other jurisdications and has been explicitly rejected by some. See Note, Negligent
Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California and Other
States, 25 HAST. L. REV. 1248 (1974). It remains true, therefore, that courts still
treat allegations of mental distress with great caution, if not outright suspicion.
Note, however, that great stress was laid on plaintiffs psychological dam-
age in Hoffman .... Given the nature of the defendant's negligence...
and the particularly sympathetic nature of the plaintiffs situation, the al-
lowance of psychological damages by the lower court in Hoffman is under-
standable. In similar fact situations, claims of such injury are appropriate,
but Hoffman does not represent the typical case.
Comment, supra note 8, at 580 n.115 (emphasis added).
199. This is best evidenced by the testimony of those favoring an educational
malpractice cause of action, see Comment, supra note 8, at 596 ("plaintiffs most
difficult task"); Note, supra note 11, at 341 ("very difficult to show the requisite
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discussion of injury suggests that one could argue that a failure to
teach does not cause a state of illiteracy because a child is born
ignorant of how to read or write. Negligent education, therefore,
cannot be said to produce a state that would not otherwise exist.
Taking a less cynical view, the causes of non-learning are so nu-
merous and ill-understood that, as a matter of law, causation
probably cannot be proven.200
Causation is perhaps one of the most difficult of all jurispruden-
tial concepts.201 In tort, the negligence plaintiff must prove, first,
that the defendant's conduct was in fact the cause of his injury202
and, second, that not only was it the factual cause but also that it
was the proximate cause of the injury.203 In dealing with cause in
fact the test commonly applied by the courts is the so-called "but
for" rule. The first Restatement of Torts states the rule thus:
"Where a person can prove that but for the tortious interference
causal relationship"). See also Note, supra note 15, at 383, 396-99; Comment, supra
note 14, at 130-32.
200. See M. SORGEN, P. DUFFY, W. KAPLIN & E. MARGOLIN, STATE, SCHOOL AND
FAMILY § 11-3 (1973):
It is exceedingly difficult to evaluate current forms of public classification
or to accurately determine their effect on scholastic achievement, because
one cannot isolate the extent to which the manner in which the school
treats children is determinative of their performances.
Contra Comment, supra note 14, at 131 ("mere fact that certain elements of a
cause of action are difficult to prove should not be the crucial factor in categori-
cally denying a cause of action"). See also note 1 supra (lack of public consensus
regarding the causes of non-learning).
201. Cause, as a basis of liability by virtue of its quality of wrongness, has
been frequently expressed in terms of unlawfulness, intent, blame, fault,
deceit, negligence-summed up as culpability. Cause has been frequently
characterized as direct, proximate, imputed, presumed, inducing, efficient,
active, culpable, and by many other descriptive terms. Moreover, liability
based on the cause concept is frequently qualified or limited by cause
characterized as remote, passive, sole, intervening, independent, super-
seding, supervening, and similar terms. The causation doctrinal super-
structure for determining liability is extensive, refined, complicated in de-
tail, and metaphysical both in thought and terminology. It was the crea-
tion of the nineteenth century during the transition period from medieval
to modern tort law, and designed as a means of limiting liability, primarily
by the judge as opposed to a jury. As a basis for the adjudication of liti-
gated tort cases it has had a weird history and has resulted in great confu-
sion of legal theory, endless, and arid legal disquisition, and many
injustices to litigants.
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L REV. 42, 42-43 (1962) (empha-
sis in the original). Anyone who has ever studied the doctrine of causation can
sympathize with this indictment Nevertheless, as a matter of legal, if not philo-
sophic, analysis it remains with us, in the law of torts as well as the law of crimes.
202. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 236-44.
203. Id. at 250-70.
of another, he would have received.., a specific [outcome] from
a transaction, he is entitled to full damages for the loss which has
thus been caused to him. .... 204 It follows that, where the loss
would have been sustained without defendant's negligent con-
duct, that conduct cannot legally be said to be a cause of the in-
jury.205
The multiplicity of factors affecting the learning process, cou-
pled with the lack of any clear understanding of the impact on
learning of any one of those factors, makes it virtually impossible
to prove that the educator's negligence was a cause in fact of a
student's illiteracy.206 Social, economic, emotional, and cultural
factors all play an essential and immeasurable role in learning. In
addition to innate intellectual ability, a child's failure to learn
may be affected by home environment, peer pressure, attitude,
motivation, personality, student-teacher interaction,207 class size,
and faculty experience. It will be readily perceived that many of
these factors are beyond the control of schools and teachers.
Some may be uncontrollable by anyone. In such a situation,
where it may be readily inferred that a student's illiteracy re-
sulted from other causes, it would be manifestly unjust to hold
educators liable for non-learning.20 8
Recognizing this, the Peter W. court held that the difficulties in
establishing causation were another reason for refusing to enter-
tain a suit for educational malpractice.
[TJhe achievement of literacy in the schools, or its failure, are influenced
by a host of factors which affect the pupil subjectively, from outside the
formal teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers. They
may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they
204. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 912, commentf at 584 (1939).
205. But see Note, supra note 58, at 45 n.127; Comment, supra note 14, at 131 &
n.102, advocating that, because of the interaction of so many causal factors, the
"substantial factor" test is more appropriate for an educational malpractice action
than the "but for" test. Under the "substantial factor" test, where multiple factors
converge to cause the plaintiff's injury, the defendant remains liable, if his or her
conduct was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the in-jury. But even under the "substantial factor" test, each factor operating alone
must have been sufficient to have caused the result. The classic case is where a
fire, set by the defendant, joins another, and the plaintiff's property is burned; but
either one of the fires could have burned the property by itself. See, e.g., Minneap-
olis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
206. See Hechinger, No One Knows What Makes A Good School, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 13, 1977, § 12, at 1, col. 1. Indirectly, this is also attested to by the very hy-
potheticals advanced by educational malpractice advocates to suggest where
cause in fact might be found. The examples used are as ethereal as the proposed
cause of action itself; e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 583 n.124 ("able student...
totally denied access to the written word").
207. See Sprinthall & Sprinthall, Learning and the Classroom, in EDUcATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY 159-60 (1969) (students affect the way adult teaches, because teacher
will tend to focus on responsive pupils).
208. See L. STAm, supra note 4, at 8; Elson, supra note 9, at 689.
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may be present but not perceived, recognized but not identified. 209
This, too, was quoted with approval by the New York appellate
court in Donohue, adding the curt but common sense observation,
"The failure to learn does not bespeak a failure to teach."210
The courts' wisdom is illustrated by the problems of proof that
a plaintiff would encounter, were a cause of action for educational
malpractice to be allowed to proceed to trial.21' Because causa-
tion in the education field would be beyond the normal under-
standing of the average lay juror, the plaintiff would have to rely
upon expert testimony. But such testimony would either be un-
available or so vehemently contested as to be valueless, due to
the widespread disagreement among educators concerning how
children learn and, thus, how they should be taught. Because stu-
dents learn at different rates and in different ways, it is difficult to
employ scientific methodology to establish the most appropriate
teaching behavior in any given situation. The result is an almost
total absence of scientific evidence and theoretical consensus as
to how best to teach.212 Expert testimony, therefore, would only
heighten the jury's confusion and pave the way for arbitrary ver-
dicts. 213
In view of the deficiencies in expert testimony, at least one ad-
vocate of a cause of action for educational malpractice has pro-
209. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (1976) (footnote omitted).
210. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 33-34, 36,
407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878, 881 (1978). See also Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 446, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (1979) (Wach-
ter, J., concurring); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 389, 410
N.Y.S.2d 99, 118 (1978) (Damiani, J., dissenting).
211. Because the thesis of this article is that a cause of action for educational
malpractice should not be recognized, a detailed discussion of the problems of
proof is technically beyond its scope. Problems of proof would, in fact, arise only
if the cause of action were entertained, and a suit were allowed to proceed to the
trier of fact. The problems are briefly mentioned here only to illustrate the diffi-
culties in establishing causation in fact that argue against permitting such causes
of action. See also note 43 supra. For more in-depth treatment of the problems of
proof in educational malpractice actions, see Comment, supra note 19, at 790-801;
Comment, supra note 8, at 582-85.
212. See B. BLOOM, HuMAN CHARACTERISTICS AND SCHOOL LEARNING (1976); M.
SORGEN, P. DuFFY, W. KAPLIN & E. MARGOLIN, supra note 200, at § 11.2 ("our knowl-
edge... is remarkably primitive").
213. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979), presents a sitution in which expert testimony was useful and should per-
haps have been successful. But there the allegation was that the plaintiff had
been misassigned in the first place, not that he had failed to receive adequate in-
struction within the class to which he was assigned.
posed a comparative method of proof "that relies on inferences
drawn from circumstantial evidence .... -"214 Under this method
of proof, plaintiff would establish causation in fact
by proving that a class of which he is a member peformed significantly
worse [on standardized achievement tests] than did classes identical in
all essential respects except that they were not taught by the defendant
teacher.2 15
Leaving aside objections to standardized tests as measures of
anything other than the ability to take a test,21 6 this proposed
method of proof, proceeding as it does from an apparently en-
demic legal naivet6 regarding social science methodology and
standards of proof,217 suffers from several flaws. First of all, it
would be impossible to identify appropriate comparison classes
"identical in all essential respects," because no one knows what
the "essential respects" are.2 18 Second, because of the vast
number of possibly relevant factors, it would be difficult, if not im-
possible, to hold all factors, other than teacher performance, con-.
stant over time. Third, even if the relevant factors could be
identified and held constant, the method of proof proposed would
be valid only if employed over a multi-year period. Poor perform-
ance by a teacher's classes in any given year would not necessar-
ily indicate teacher incompetence but might be more reasonably
attributed to some situation unique to that year. The method of
proof, thus, would be inapplicable to beginning or relatively inex-
perienced teachers, as well as to elderly teachers who, though
previously competent, had become incompetent due, perhaps, to
senility. Fourth, this comparative method of proof would be lim-
ited to class actions and would not be readily available to individ-
ual plaintiffs like Donohue and Peter W. Indeed, this method
would not even be relevant to proving the generalized allegations
of those plaintiffs. Peter W. and Donohue did not argue that a
specific teacher or teachers or an identifiable program were at
fault. Their contentions were much simpler. They just argued
that they had graduated unprepared and that someone-other
than themselves-ought to pay for that.
Because it "seems impossible to prove that the substandard re-
sult was not the consequence of the student's own lack of intelli-
214. Comment, supra note 19, at 790.
215. Id. at 790-91. Presumably the method is intended to be applied to compari-
sons between school districts and between schools within a single district, as well
as to teachers.
216. See note 181 supra and accompanying test. See also C. JENCKS, INEQUAL-
ITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1972)
(teacher quality does not have much effect on achievement test scores).
217. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L REV. 150 (1955); A. DAVIS, THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA (1974).
218. See notes 206-09 supra and accompanying text.
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gence, aptitude, diligence, attitude, ambition, or general
educability,"219 the educational malpractice advocate would have
to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.220 But the lack of
any demonstrable correlation between teacher quality, test
scores, cognitive skills, and economic success should defeat such
reliance.221
Therefore, in a situation where variables that are uncontrollable
by the defendant play such a predominant role in causing the al-
leged injury, not only should liability not attach but also, in the
interest of judicial economy, the cause of action should not be en-
tertained in the first place.
Moreover, even were the causal relationship between failure to
learn and failure to teach less speculative and remote, courts
might still deny recovery for failure to prove proximate causation.
While it may be that "the educational process would be meaning-
less if some kind of causal relationship between the behavior of
teachers and learning by students did not exist,"222 more than
this is required by the law of negligence. The doctrine of proxi-
mate causation requires that the plaintiffs injury be the natural,
probable, and foreseeable consequence of the defendant's con-
duct.223 To be held liable, the defendant must have been able to
foresee that a breach of the duty of care owed to the defendant
would cause not only an injury to the plaintiff (cause in fact) but
also the particular type of injury actually suffered by the plaintiff.
Of course, were some scientifically valid correlation to be demon-
strated between learning and classroom methods, common sense
would almost inevitably point to the conclusion that non-learning
was a clearly foreseeable risk of poor classroom performance. 224
219. Comment, supra note 19, at 790.
220. See Byrne v. Boadle, 2 L & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment d at 157-58. Whether the doctrine would
even be available is, in fact, problematic. Res ipsa loquitur has been used to es-
tablish causation in medical malpractice actions, see, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), but is not applied in attorney malpractice cases, see
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, in T. ROADY & W. ANDERSEN, supra
note 11, at 228. For criticism of the doctrine and suggestions that the courts should
abandon it, see Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAInF. L. REV. 183
(1949); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARv. L. REV. 643
(1950).
221. C. JENCKS, supra note 216.
222. Comment, supra note 8, at 582 (emphasis in the original).
223. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 250-70.
224. This may account for the brief, almost offhand treatment that probable
cause has been accorded by the advocates of an educational malpractice cause of
But in Donohue the lower court held that
the plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because of the practical impos-
sibility of demonstrating that a breach of the alleged common law and
statutory duties was the proximate cause of his failure to learn .... [I]t
is virtually impossible to calculate to what extent, if any, the defendant's
acts or omissions proximately caused the plaintiff's inability to read at his
appropriate grade level.22 5
The Donohue court may have been in error. But proximate
cause is often a vehicle for the expression of judicial policy con-
cerns that affect recognition of a negligence cause of action.2 26
The language of proximate cause may be used to limit legal re-
sponsibility for conduct that has been proven to be a cause in
fact. Thus, even if educational misfeasance could be proven to be
a cause in fact of functional illiteracy, the educational malpractice
plaintiff, having established all the other elements of a negligence
cause of action, could still be denied recovery on a conservative
view of proximate cause. Whether that should or should not be
the case, however, requires an examination of the policy consider-
ations and consequences that underlie the educational malprac-
tice debate.227
action. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 585 & 596; Note, supra note 11, at 354;
Comment, supra note 19, at 768.
225. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 35, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978) (emphasis added).
226. Although courts do balance policy considerations under the rubric of prox-
imate cause, some have suggested the causal relation is simply a question of fact
and that policy should only be considered in the determination of duty; see, e.g.,
Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L REv. 543 (1962).
227. Were a suit for educational malpractice to be allowed to proceed, rather
than being summarily dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff
would encounter still other problems. While detailed consideration of these issues
is not relevant here, because this article takes the position that such causes of ac-
tion should not be entertained, some of them may be briefly reognized.
Whatever theory the educational malpractice plaintiff proceeds under, all of the
usual defenses will presumably be available to the defendant. For example, in a
suit bottomed on a negligence theory, the defendant may plead contributory negli-
gence in those jurisdictions that still recognize this defense. See Sugarman, supra
note 4, at 247; Abel, Can a Student Sue the Schools for Educational Malpractice?,
44 HARv. EDUC. REV. 416, 428 (1974). The educational malpractice defendant may
allege and prove that a plaintiff-student failed to attend class, exhibited a negative
attitude toward learning, did not do assignments, or seldom paid attention in class,
thereby causing his own injury. Such a defense, however, would be unavailable in
those jurisdictions that make it impossible for a child below a certain age to be
contributorily negligent. See W. PRossER, supra note 11, at 156-57, 419 & n.31, 447 &
n.82. Even in jurisdictions where such a defense is theoretically available, courts
are reluctant to attribute contributory negligence to a child. See, e.g., Bear v.
Auguy, 164 Neb. 756, 768, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1957) (extreme situation required to
bar child from recovery due to contributory negligence). On the other hand, to the
extent that a student's age would limit the availability of affrmative defenses, edu-
cational malpractice would approach becoming a strict liability tort, and this con-
sequence courts should not overlook in deciding whether or not to recognize it as
a cause of action.
Against a plaintiff-parent, an educational malpractice defendant might argue
[voL. 18: 743, 1981] Educational Malpractice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As has already been seen, the courts' legal analyses of educa-
that the parent failed to encourage the child to read, did not assist in developing
literacy skills, or created a home environment not conducive to study. Alterna-
tively, the defendant might turn the tables on the parent-plaintiff by alleging that,
once the parent knew or should have known that the public school system was
failing to fulfill its educational mission, the parent had a duty to exercise reason-
able care to see that other provisions were made for the child's education.
These positions are futher complicated by the fact that the negligence of the
child may be imputed to the parent, although the reverse is not true: Parental
negligence cannot bar the child from recovery. See, e.g., Welter v. Curry, 260 Ark.
287, 302, 539 S.W.2d 264, 273 (1976) (child's contributory negligence may be as-
serted against parent); contra Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa
1976) (child's contributory negligence does not bar parental recovery).
For further discussion of defense problems in this area, including the availabil-
ity of a student's suit against his or her parents for failure to ensure their educa-
tion, the impact of intra-familial immunity, and the possibility of an educational
malpractice defendant impleading parents as third-party defendants, see Note,
supra note 58, at 52-55.
In those jurisdictions that have abandoned contributory negligence in favor of
comparative fault, e.g., Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), any or all of the above considerations would
work to limit the educational malpractice defendant's liability. See generally V.
SCHWARTZ, COmPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974). Indeed, they may very well limit de-
fendants' liability to such an extent in so many cases that the question must arise
whether recognizing the cause of action is worth the effort.
The defense of assumption of risk, however, would not be available, since at-
tendance is not voluntary. Besides, it would be a strange argument for an educa-
tor to make. But see note 292 infra.
But the most effective defense would remain the denial of any causal relation-
ship between the harm allegedly suffered and the negligent conduct asserted. See
notes 199-226 supra and accompanying text.
The educational malpractice plaintiff would also have to consider the question of
what is the appropriate remedy to be sought. In the public school context, at least
three alternative forms of relief would be available: (1) monetary damages, com-
pensating the plaintiff for the disability suffered and its effect on future earnings
potential, (2) provision of or payment for remedial education, or (3) dismissal of
incompetent teachers.
Removal of incompetent teachers would have the advantage of avoiding the po-
tentially detrimental and far-reaching effects of substantial compensatory and pu-
nitive damage awards. But, while this alternative would eliminate future harm, it
will do nothing to recompense the student-plaintiffs who have already been sub-
jected to the incompetent teacher or teachers. Moreover, where teacher union
contracts are involved, dismissal may not be so easily accomplished, particularly if
the contract provision permitting removal "for cause" does not recognize negli-
gence or incompetence as a valid "cause." See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Ordering the defendant to make available to the defendant an appropriate reme-
dial program would simply involve reassigning the defendant to the public school
system that produced the injury in the first place, a result anomalous in the ex-
treme. Remedial instruction, in fact, is the most illogical of the alternative reme-
dies, for it would neither deter future harm nor make whole those students who
tional malpractice claims have been strongly influenced by con-
siderations of public policy.228 Conversely, the logical constructs
of legal reasoning have also shaped their policy analyses. 229 In
Peter W., for example, the court indicated that the lack of "readily
acceptable standards of care, or cause, or injury" was a policy fac-
tor that argued against recognizing educational malpractice as a
cause of action.230 In Donohue, on the other hand, the New York
Court of Appeals relied almost exclusively on public policy to
hold that, although such standards could be framed, the courts
should make no effort to frame them.231 Even the lower court in
Hoffman, though permitting a cause of action for negligence in ac-
had been subjected to the inadequate instruction. Moreover, for those who see ed-
ucational malpractice suits as a means of reforming public education, the remedy
of additional instruction offers no prospect for improving the regular school pro-
gram. In short, the only thing that remedial instruction, as a remedy in an educa-
tional malpractice action, has to commend it is that, like dismissal of incompetent
teachers, it would avoid the substantial monetary awards that would be contrary
to sound public policy and deter insincere plaintiffs merely seeking a windfall.
On the other hand, "the award of money damages for diminished earnings could
be a potentially crushing burden upon a school district, especially in a class ac-
tion." Comment, supra note 19, at 759 (footnotes omitted). Recall that the plaintiff
in Donohue sought five million dollars ($5,000,000); Hoffman was willing to settle
for a mere five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000). But such awards, particularly
where they attempted to restore lost future earning potential, would be almost
wholly speculative. See note 197 supra and accompanying text. As has already
been seen, the difficulty of calculating damages for non-learning weighs against its
recognition as a tort injury. See notes 190-98 supra and accompanying text.
Of course, the remedies which would be available and appropriate would de-
pend upon the theory under which the educational malpractice action was
brought. For example, if the suit were premised on a contract theory, the damages
recoverable should be limited to the benefit of the bargain. But what was the bar-
gain? See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text. And a plaintiff suing on con-
tract would be under a duty to minimize his or her damages, but a litigant resting
on misrepresentation could avoid this requirement. See W. PROSSER, supra note
11, at 422-24.
For further discussion of the remedies available to educational malpractice
plaintiffs and the problems attendant on each, see Comment, supra note 8, at 581,
595, 596; Note, supra note 11, at 355; Note, supra note 58, at 56.58; Comment, supra
note 19, at 757-60.
The nature and extent of the remedies available in educational malpractice
suits, however, are considerations intimately related to the fundamental public
policy issues which should determine whether such a cause of action should be
recognized or not.
228. See notes 28-32, 37-49, 163-66 & 226-27 supra and accompanying text.
229. This judicial tendency to intermingle law and policy has been severely
criticized by some commentators; see, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 586 ("...
confusing real policy issues with abstract pleading arguments only weakens re-
spect for judicial reasoning.. ."). But see W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 325 ("..
'duty' is... only an expression of the sum total of... considerations of policy
230. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131
CaL Rptr. 854, 860 (1976).
231. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443-44, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1354-55, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
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ademic instruction, was moved to stress the limited nature of its
holding. Its decision, the court said,
does not mean that the parents of the Johnnies who cannot read may flock
to the courts and automatically obtain redress. Nor does it mean that the
parents of all the Janies whose delicate egos were upset because they did
not get the gold stars they deserved will obtain redress. If the door to "ed-
ucational torts". . is to be opened ... it will not be by this case .... 232
The Court of Appeals, however, would not go even that far and
flatly held that it was the public policy of the State of New York
that no cause of action should exist for educational malprac-
tice.233 Clearly, a judicial reluctance to intervene in the operation
of the schools has been a pervasive theme in the educational mal-
practice litigation.
This reluctance has been motivated by extra-legal concerns that
go far beyond the mere technicalities of pleading. The principal
policy objections to recognition of a cause of action for educa-
tional malpractice appear to be of two types. The first consists of
concerns internal to the judiciary. Among these is the impact
such recognition would have on the courts; in particular, it is
feared that the result would be to burden the courts with a flood
of claims, many of which would be frivolous if not, in fact, feigned.
At the same time, there is acute awareness that most judges pos-
sess little, if any, expertise in the complex educational issues that
are and would be involved in malpractice suits. 2 34 The second set
of objections proceeds from a consideration of matters external to
the judiciary. On the one hand, the courts have taken judicial no-
tice of the existence of alternative procedures for correcting, re-
forming, or deterring incompetent instruction.235 On the other
hand, grave doubt has been expressed as to the desirability of the
consequences that would flow from recognizing an educational
malpractice cause of action. The impact on education might be
232. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 379-80, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 110
(1978). Thus, the court sought to ground its decision on a characterization of the
defendant school board's negligence as misfeasance, expressly declining to recog-
nize suits for nonfeasance. As for the utility of the distinction, see notes 13 & 56
supra and accompanying text.
233. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 400 N.E.2d 317, 320, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (1979).
234. The absence of any judicially manageable standards is no doubt also a fac-
tor of the courts' perceived incompetence; see notes 172-79 & 184-89 supra and ac-
companying text.
235. A related, though slightly different, policy argument is that judicial inter-
vention would contravene principles of democratic government; regarding this ar-
gument, see note 264 infra.
financial, adding to the costs of the already beleagured public
schools, or behavioral, disrupting classroom relationships and en-
couraging "defensive" teaching. Or the impact might be both. In
any event, the purported benefits of holding the educational mal-
practitioner liable would be more than offset by the negative con-
sequences.
Advocates of a cause of action for educational malpractice, of
course, denigrate the idea that recognition of such a cause will
lead either to a flood of litigation or to disruption of the educa-
tional process. 236 The rationale for refusing to exempt doctors
from liability for malpractice is, these advocates contend, equally
applicable to teachers. They are skeptical of the feasibility of pro-
cedures other than judicial for satisfying claims of improper or in-
competent instruction. As for the problem of judicial
understanding, the courts, they confidently opine, can "intelli-
gently sift the wheat from the chaff."237
But, it can be argued, that is exactly what the courts have al-
ready done in refusing to recognize a cause of action for educa-
tional malpractice. Providing a judicial remedy for the infliction
of educational injury would have wider consequences than simply
allowing compensation to a few individual students for the harms
they have allegedly suffered at the hands of the public schools.
However, they may have confused their policy analyses with their
legal arguments, the courts seem to have reached the right result
in the educational malpractice cases.
236. For discussions of the policy issues underlying judicial reticence in the ed-
ucational malpractice cases by advocates of such a cause of action, see Comment,
supra note 8, at 585-93; Elson, supra note 9, at 645-93; Note, supra note 58, at 33-41;
Comment, supra note 19, at 760-66.
* 237. See Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (hold-
ing physician liable in negligence), modified on other grounds, 60 App. Div. 2d 80,
400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977):
What statute or theory of law grants preferential treatment or immunity
to the medical profession? The court is the guardian of the rights of all
the citizenry, not only a chosen few .... To use the worn-out, rejected
cliche of "public policy" is to single out and grant preferential treatment
to the medical profession over all other professions and enterprises where
malpractice could result in payment of ensuing resultant damages. This
was never truly contemplated by either the general public, the Legislature
or the Court. This court further believes that contrary to the fear ... as
to "fraudulent claims" or a "sensible stopping point", that the Judiciary
can intelligently sift the wheat from the chaff and that it has the ability to
succinctly deal with any attempted fraudulent scheme or claim and make
short shrift thereof.
Id. at 231-32, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 211. As could be expected, this passage from Park is
an oft-quoted favorite of those who wish to see an educational malpractice cause
of action recognized; see, e.g., Elson, supra note 9, at n.42.
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Internal Concerns
The courts' concern for the judicial effect of creating this new
cause of action has perhaps been most succinctly stated by the
Court of Appeals in Donohue.
To entertain a cause of action for "educational malpractice" would require
the courts not merely to make judgments as to the validity of broad educa-
tional policies-a course we have unalteringly eschewed in the past-but,
more importantly, to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of
those policies.23a
In other words, a lack of judicial expertise in the subject matter
coupled with the undue burden to be placed upon the courts cau-
tions against recognizing the cause of action. And, indeed, the po-
tential for frivolous claims would appear to be almost limitless. In
In re Gregory B., for example, one of the students' allegations
was that "their teachers are mean to them."239 The court was not
impressed.
Excessive litigation. But the claim that a flood of litigation will
result is one that can be (and has been) 240 raised against the rec-
ognition of any new cause of action. Were such a consideration to
be decisive, the law would be incapable of growth and adaptation.
"It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it,
even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation' and it is a pitiful con-
fession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny
relief on such grounds. '24 1 Without more, the "excessive litiga-
tion" argument simply proves too much, and the advocates of a
cause of action for educational malpractice are on firm ground in
rejecting it as a general principle.
When one moves from a generalized to a particularized analy-
sis, however, objections to the potential impact upon the courts of
this new cause of action become weightier.242 The commentators
238. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
239. 88 Misc. 2d 313, 318, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380, 385 (1976).
240. See, e.g., note 11 supra (products liability).
241. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 51. It must be noted, however, that Prosser
confines his endorsement of new causes of action to "wrongs that deserve" a rem-
edy (emphasis added). Thus, advocates of a cause of action for educational mal-
practice must bear the burden of demonstrating that a genuine need for relief is
present, a burden that, so far, they have not successfully borne.
242. An alternative objection related to the potential volume of litigation is that,
if recognizing educational malpractice as a cause of action would result in a sub-
stantial amount of litigation, the cost to the defendant school boards and teachers
would be such as to detrimentally effect the overall quality of education. Any ben-
have sought to dismiss the courts' fears of excessive litigation by
* analogizing educational malpractice claims to other types of pro-
fessional malpractice actions.
Comparing educational malpractice to other "new" types of malpractice
actions,... there is no reason to differentiate between educational mal-
practice and other forms of malpractice litigation which currently congest
the courts. 2 4 3
Such an argument, however, (1) rests upon a crucial admission
and (2) overlooks a critical, empirical fact.
The empirical fact overlooked is the simple number of potential
plaintiffs, were an educational *malpractice cause of action to be
recognized. Ironically enough, the compulsory education laws-
the very bedrock of many of the legal theories for recognizing the
cause of action-, coupled with the existence of a publicly
financed school system, insure that many more will be subjected
to education than will ever consult a doctor, a lawyer, or an archi-
tect.244
The crucial admission is that other forms of malpractice litiga-
tion are already congesting the courts.245 Why add to that conges-
tion? In fact, as a logical matter, this argument can just as easily
cut the other way-abandon the other malpractice causes of ac-
tion for the reasons that the courts have declined to recognize ed-
ucational malpractice as a viable cause of action. Like its
counterpart, the "excessive litigation" argument, this argument,
too, proves too much.
The courts' fears of excessive litigation, therefore, are not as
groundless as the commentators suggest. Those fears, moreover,
are occasioned by the nature and depth, as well as the breadth, of
judicial involvement-that is contemplated by educational malprac-
tice litigation.2 Generally, educational malpractice advocates
have sought to conduct a broad and total attack upon the public
school program. The object has been reform, and the choices
presented to the courts have been intricate. So far, the courts
have declined to make such choices for the laudibly candid rea-
son that they wouldn't know what they are doing.
efit to individual plaintiffs would, then, be overshadowed by the negative systemic
impact. For a discussion of the potential costs of recognizing educational malprac-
tice as a cause of action, see notes 268-92 infra and accompanying text. Because
this concern is not related to the internal operation of the judiciary, however, it is
not considered at this point.
243. Note, supra note 11, at 342 & 351 (footnote omitted).
244. See generally T. ROADY & W. ANDERSEN, supra note 11.
245. See IL JALEs, CRIsis n ThE COURTS (rev. ed. 1971).
246. See note 238 supra and accompanying text see also In re Gregory B., 88
Misc. 2d 313, 317, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380, 384 (1976).
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Judicial expertise. In addition to a fear of excessive and possi-
bly fraudulent claims that could unduly burden the courts, the ed-
ucational malpractice decisions have reflected a concern for
judicial inability to formulate standards for teaching and learning.
Where educators themselves have failed, there appears little rea-
son to believe that courts would be successful. "Education," the
Supreme Court has noted, ". .. presents a myraid of 'intractable
economic, social, and even philosophical problems.'- 247 Judicial
decisionmakers, however, are untrained in the substantive issues
of pedagogical policy and, even if they were, lack adequate infor-
mation gathering and deliberative processes to make an informed
evaluation of them.248 Recognizing this, the lower court in Dono-
hue was moved to observe,
The courts are an inappropriate forum to test the efficacy of educational
programs and pedagogical methods. That judicial interference would be
the inevitable result of the recognition of [educational malpractice as a
cause of action] is clear from the fact that in presenting their case, plain-
tiffs would, of necessity, call upon [the courts] to decide whether they
should have been taught one subject instead of another, or whether one
teaching method was more appropriate than another, or whether certain
tests should have been administered or test results interpreted in one way
rather than another, and so on, ad infinitum. It simply is not within the
judicial function to evaluate conflicting theories of how best to educate.249
As previously discussed, there is no agreement and, in fact, con-
siderable, rancorous dispute among educators as to appropriate
instructional strategies. 250 Some favor holding slow learners
back, others support "tracking" theory, which groups students of
similar learning abilities; still others rely upon a variety of reme-
dial programs to assist those pupils who fall behind.251 It seems
unlikely that the courts can resolve that which educators cannot.
Indeed, even some of the educational malpractice critics have
conceded that "[t] here is ... no doubt that the formulation and
247. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973), quoting
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (upholding state welfare regula-
tion). The Court's point was that the judiciary is an even more inappropriate fo-
rum of overseeing the daily operation of the school system than it is for operating
the welfare system.
248. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1129 (1969); Kuriloff, Truc & Kirp, Legal Reform and Educational Change: The
Pennsylvania Case, 41 EXCEPTIONAL Cmn RN 35, 41 (1974); D. HoRowrrz, THE
CouaTs AND SOcIAL PoLicy 33-56 (1977).
249. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 34, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 879 (1978).
250. See notes 172-89 supra and accompanying text.
251. See Shanker, supra note 174, at 4.
implementation of educational policy, which is inevitable in the
determination of issues of educational [malpractice], can be ac-
complished more effectively by school officials than by judges."252
One need not subscribe to the romantic idea that the teacher al-
ways knows best 253 to believe that career teachers and school ad-
ministrators are more qualified to formulate educational policy
than are courts. The teacher may not know best, but he or she
probably knows better. As the Supreme Court put the matter in
Hortonville Junior School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education
Association,
Policymaking is a process of prudential judgment, and we are not pre-
pared to say that a judge can generally make a better policy judgment or
... as good a judgment as the School Board, which is intimately familiar
with all the needs of the school district, or that a school board must, at the
risk of suspending school operations, wend its way through judicial
processes not mandated by the legislature.254
The determination of the requisite level of instructional quality
within a school system and how to attain it is a fundamental pol-
icy-making function that educators are better equipped to handle
than are courts. The judicial process, therefore, should eschew
discretionary decisions of educator competence.25 5 In fact, the
New York Court of Appeals has gone even farther and has held
that, within the State of New York, educational policy must be
left to the appropriate school authorities.256 If they fail to exer-
cise their powers in an appropriate manner, the remedy should be
legislative or administrative, not judicial. "Such matters as the
competence of teachers . .. are peculiarly appropriate to state
and local administration." 257
As new teaching methods are devised and as urban growth demands
changed patterns of instruction, the only realistic way the state can adjust
is through legislative study, discussion and continuing revision of the con-
trolling statutes. Even if there were some guidelines available to the judi-
ciary, the courts simply cannot provide the empirical research and
252. Elson, supra note 9, at 677.
253. But cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593-94 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(eulogizing teachers generally in the context of a discussion of the Justice's own
"warmly remembered" school days). The statements of Mr. Justice Powell, him-
self a former school board member, concerning the nature and function of educa-
tion constitute one of the more curious bodies of judicial opinion in modern
American jurisprudence.
254. 426 U.S. 482, 496 n.5 (1976).
255. See Scheelaase v. Woodbury Central Community School Dist., 488 F.2d 237
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
256. James v. Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934
(1977). See also Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77
(1965) (educational policies are solely the province of state educational authority).
257. Scheelaase v. Woodbury Central Community School Dist., 488 F.2d 237,
243-44 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
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consultation necessary for intelligent educational planning.2 58
External Concerns
The availability of alternative processes for correcting the
wrongs of which educational malpractice plaintiffs have com-
plained has been yet another policy consideration that has influ-
enced the courts to decline to recognize the proposed cause of
action. While these alternatives are external to the litigation, the
courts could hardly ignore their existence. Nor can the courts fail
to be troubled by the potential consequences of judicial interven-
tion in this peculiarly sensitive area of educational policy.
Alternative procedures. The absence of judicial competence in
the educational field, coupled with the lack of either reliable data
or acceptable theory on which to base a judicial determination, is
a compelling argument against establishing a cause of action for
educational malpractice. But it would not be sufficient, were
there no non-judicial mechanisms for dealing with incompetent
academic instruction. When, however, it is recognized that such
alternatives are already in place and that they provide a more effi-
cient remedy to the problem, the policy argument against judicial
intervention becomes persuasive. Among the extra-legal
processes available to correct educational malpractice are polit-
ical action, certification procedures that impose minimum qualifi-
cations on educators, professional review systems, supervisory
control over teaching behaviors, and school boards' powers to ter-
minate incompetent teachers.25 9 Parents may also have an oppor-
tunity to utilize intrasystem grievance procedures to challenge
the instruction their children are receiving.26 0 Thus far, no educa-
tional malpractice plaintiff has alleged, let alone proven, that
these various alternatives are inadequate to prevent or deter neg-
ligent or incompetent teaching.
In fact, the plaintiffs in Hoffman and Donohue had not even at-
258. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affid per curiam
sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
259. See Comment, supra note 8, at 591-92; Comment, supra note 19, at 764.
260. Internal grievance procedures, however, would be inadequate, unless the
parents are aware of their child's learning difficulty while he or she is still an en-
rolled student and have notice of the availability of the grievance mechanism.
There is, moreover, no certainty that the grievance procedure will produce a reso-
lution acceptable to the parents. The shortcomings of such administrative mecha-
nisms, however, is no argument for ignoring them.
tempted to avail themselves of the administrative remedies avail-
able to them.26' This led the Court of Appeals to state in
Donohue that it could not overlook the right of public school stu-
dents and their parents to enlist the aid of the State Commis-
sioner of Education to insure that such students were receiving a
proper education.262 Under the New York education law, any per-
son aggrieved by any official act or decision of any school officer,
school authority, or meeting concerning any matter within the
purview of the law, or by any other act or decision pertaining to
the public schools, was entitled to seek review of such act or deci-
sion by the Commissioner.263 This the plaintiff and his parents
had wholly failed to do.
Moreover, it is not simply the availability of these procedures
but also the legislative intent in creating them that argues against
judicial interference. In most states, the purpose of making edu-
cational policy solely the province of the duly constituted educa-
tional authority is to remove all matters pertaining to the public
school system, insofar as feasible, from controversy in the
courts.26
4
Conceding the need for reform and improvement in American
public education, conceding the need for some form of external
control to assure better teacher and administrative performance,
it does not follow that that external control must be judicial. The
judicial process is slow, costly, inefficient, and "prone to miscon-
ceive the public good."265 New causes of action generally develop
in response to societal demand, but new causes of action are not
the only possible responses to legitimate social concerns. The na-
261. See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 36-37,
407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 379-81,
410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 108-09 (1978).
262. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
263. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 310, subd. 7 (MeKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978).
264. See, e.g., James v. Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 397
N.Y.S.2d 934 (1977); Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77
(1965).
An alternative form of the argument that existing administrative and legislative
practices are adequate is the argument that judicial determination of educational
malpractice claims would contravene democratic principles of government. This
argument is discussed by Elson, supra note 9, at 659-67, who attempts to rebut it.
But see Hazard, Courts in the Saddle: School Boards Out, 56 Plm DELTA KAPPAN
259 (1974); Glazer, Towards An Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PuB. INTEREST 104 (1975);
A. BIcKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1977); D. HoRowrrz, supra note 248. The
argument is too detailed and philosophic to be discussed in this article. It should
be noted, however, that despite Professor Elson's discussion of it, the democratic
theory argument has been neither raised by the plaintiffs nor addressed by the
courts in any of the actual educational malpractice litigation.
265. American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538,
556 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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tionwide movement in state legislatures, state departments of ed-
ucation, and local school boards to adopt minimum competency
standards and tests is evidence both of the growing public con-
cern for students graduating without minimal skills and of the ca-
pacity of non-judicial agencies to respond to that concern.266
While the means of educational reform selected, minimum com-
petency testing, may be subject to serious reservations, 267 the
point is that legislative or administrative institution of evaluative
and remedial programs obviates the need for judicial interven-
tion, without leaving students remediless. So long as the legisla-
tures are legislating, the problem of educational malpractice
should be left to legislation. The social importance of education
will be better served by political than by judicial solutions.
Educational impact. This becomes particularly manifest when
one examines, as have the courts,2 6 8 the possible consequences
that the recognition of a cause of action for educational malprac-
tice would have for the public schools. Permitting suits for non-
learning would have two primary effects. First, there would be
the additional costs that the already financially hard-pressed pub-
lic school systems would be required to bear. The result would
likely be a further reduction in, rather than an improvement of,
educational services. Second, even were there no such reduction,
awarding damages for malpractice could have a number of disrup-
tive impacts upon educational processes. In either case, the con-
sequences would be undesirable.
Substantial damage awards would have a disastrous effect upon
finite and shrinking public school budgets.269 Originally, those
who advocated creating a cause of action for educational malprac-
tice argued that "[a] school district is obviously a better loss
bearer than an individual student because it can pass on
whatever remedy is awarded to the general public in the form of
266. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977, § 1, at 31, col. 5 (report on national enthusi-
asm for competency testing).
267. See notes 294-305 infra and accompanying text; McClung, Competency Test-
ing: Potentialfor Discrimination, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE 439 (1977).
268. E.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814,
825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47
N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
269. Regarding the size of the damage awards that educational malpractice
plaintiffs have already sought, see note 227 supra. The highly speculative nature
of such claims has, of course, been one of the reasons for the courts' dismissing
the suits for failure to state a cause of action. See notes 197, 198 & 227 supra.
increased taxes." 270 Today, only a few years after that was writ-
ten, the confident assertion about the general public's willingness
to sustain additional taxation has a faintly nostalgic ring. In the
face of public resistance to tax increases, heightened competition
for the remaining tax dollars available, and public hostility toward
the schools, 27 1 public education would almost certainly have to di-
minish still further the quality of its services. Nor would liability
insurance provide a panacea, for the premiums themselves would
have to come from the public revenues. 272
In addition to any damage awards, recognition of a cause of ac-
tion for educational malpractice would present the schools with
other costs as well. Depending upon the remedy that a court
might select, a school district might be required to make exten-
sive (and expensive) curricular changes or to introduce remedial
programs. Exactly how the situation would be resolved if the
school district could prove that it was not provided with adequate
funds to comply with such an order is difficult to predict.273
Short of that, preparing and defending malpractice suits would
itself be a drain on the school system's resources. Particularly
would this be true, if the courts' fears of a flood of litigation were
to prove to be justified. In fact, even the advocates of an educa-
tional malpractice cause of action, themselves fearful of a major
fiscal outflow, have recommended only a limited damage
formula 274 or have sought to allay fears by arguing that recogni-
tion of the cause of action won't really result in very many suits
anyway.275 "[I]t is probable that many potential plaintiffs will be
270. Comment, supra note 19, at 762. Note also that this sanguine asseveration
rests upon the unarticulated, but not unarguable, assumption that the student has,
in fact, suffered a loss. But see notes 190-98 supra and accompanying text.
271. See note 1 supra. Ironically, the very social psychological atmosphere out
of which the charges of educational malpractice have arisen is one of the data
courts should consider in making the policy determination of whether to allow for
such causes of action; see note 28 supra and accompanying text.
272. If, because of immunity from liability, see note 12 supra, a school district
could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for a teacher's
incompetence or for its own negligence in hiring the incompetent teacher, dam-
ages would necessarily have to be awarded against the teacher. In view of the nig-
gardly awards that most public school teachers could sustain, this is obviously not
what most educational malpractice advocates would desire. Moreover, holding
teachers individually liable or requiring them to retain malpractice insurance
would have the undesirable effect of discouraging many from entering or remain-
ing in the occupation. Attempts to pass on to the public teachers' insurance costs
through higher salaries would again require higher taxes and meet with the same
opposition.
273. A court effort to require adequate funding would amount to a judicial exer-
cise of the appropriation power and would definitely raise questions of democratic
theory and the legitimacy of such an action; see note 264 supra.
274. E.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 594-95; Note, supra note 58, at 13, 36, 56.
275. Eg., Comment, supra note 8, at 587-88; Elson, supra note 9, at 652.
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from socially and economically deprived backgrounds, and thus
unlikely to bring suit because of their limited resources and rela-
tive alienation from the judicial system."276 Apart from comment-
ing upon the cynicism of such a position (and it is cynical in the
extreme), it must be noted that restricting the cause of action in
such a way that "many suits could be dismissed at the earliest
possible stage solely on the pleadings"277 will still require the
schools to devote time, money, and effort to the preparation of
their pleadings. 278 This, in turn, will require shifting money and
personnel that would otherwise be available for instruction to the
detriment of the educational program. It was exactly these kinds
of fiscal considerations that led the Supreme Court to decline to
become involved in questions of educational finance,2 79 and the
lower courts should find them dispositive in the case of educa-
tional malpractice.
That would not be the case, were recognition of a cause of ac-
tion for educational malpractice to improve the quality of the pub-
lic schools.2 80 On balance, however, it appears unlikely that
holding educators liable for non-learning will result in improved
education. Particularized suits against individual teachers are
"probably not an effective approach to a general upgrading of edu-
cation."28 1 On the other hand, broad-scale attacks upon school
districts or even whole school systems may produce instructional
behaviors or approaches to student evaluation that will be
counter-productive.
Conceptually, it is possible that malpractice litigation could
have a positive educational effect. The fear of lawsuits by dissat-
isfied students or their parents might deter negligent school ad-
ministration, prevent the hiring of incompetent teachers, reform
276. Comment, supra note 8, at 588.
277. Id. at 587.
278. The assertion that "contributory negligence represents a viable response
to the floodgate argument" is subject to the same objections and is even weaker.
For one thing, the defense is not available in many jurisdictions. For another, the
existence of the defense is not likely to deter the hopeful plaintiff or the ingenious
plaintiff's counsel; and, even when the defense is available and successful, it will
require the expenditure of the schools' limited resources in defending the litiga-
tion.
279. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
280. For a survey of some of the educational benefits that would allegedly flow
from recognizing educational malpractice as a cause of action, see Elson, supra
note 9, at 657-59.
281. Comment, supra note 19, at 756.
classroom practices, and generally upgrade the quality of public
education. The likely reality, however, is otherwise.282 Imposing
liability on school districts, educational administrators, and teach-
ers will only encourage "defensive education."
As has been observed, the advocates of an educational malprac-
tice cause of action are fond of drawing an analogy between edu-
cation and medicine. 283 But permitting patients to sue doctors,
hospitals, and hospital administrators has not resulted in im-
proved health care.284 Apart from benefiting the sellers of liability
insurance, recognizing a cause of action for medical malpractice
has led to the practice of "defensive medicine," such as the ad-
ministration of numerous, unnecessary tests.2 85 Teaching and ad-
ministering the schools in the face of malpractice liability would
result in the same misallocation of resources.
It would also have the probable effect of discouraging many
qualified individuals from entering education as a career. Even if
the availability of malpractice insurance could reduce the fear of
financial liability, the prospect of being subjected to embarassing
courtroom proceedings would remain. And, were the courts actu-
ally to find educational malpractice in a few cases, the public
would probably draw the inference that incompetence was wide-
spread in education, making the field even more unattractive.
The ironic result would be to diminish still further education's
claim to the status of profession.286 Given the potential remuner-
ation, people still become doctors, despite malpractice liability
and its negative connotations. But it is difficult to believe that
competent persons would choose to become educators if faced
with such prospects.
Malpractice liability's capacity for discouraging prospective ed-
ucators would be heightened by the ambiguous nature of the
charge. The reformers and critics have yet to specify what con-
duct they see as constituting educational malpractice; or, con-
versely, their definitions are overly inclusive.2 87 If a student is
promoted without having attained the requisite skill level, that is
educational malpractice. But, if a student fails to progress, that,
too, may be educational malpractice. One advocate of educational
malpractice as a cause of action has complained that, in spite of
282. See Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91
HARv. L. REV. 428 (1977).
283. See notes 11 & 237 supra.
284. Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine,
1971 DuKE L.J. 939.
285. Id.
286. See notes 141-48 supra and accompanying text.
287. See note 13 supra.
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the billions spent on education, 'twenty-three percent of all stu-
dents fail to graduate from high school."288 But, if educational
malpractice were recognized as a cause of action, presumably
even more will fail to graduate; the elimination of social promo-
tions, coupled with the student's legal right to leave school after a
certain age, suggests that many will not secure diplomas. Were
such muddled analysis to become legal doctrine, educators would
be presented with an insoluble dilemma, damned if they did and
damned if they didn't. Thus, the critics' own confusion as to what
is meant by educational malpractice and its consequently discour-
aging effect upon those who might consider education as a career
is itself a strong policy argument against recognizing the cause of
action.
Additionally discouraging is the admission by some advocates
that educational malpractice suits not only could but also would
be used for purposes of harassment.289 The object is not even
that the suits will be won. Litigation is simply to be used as a co-
ercive device.
Tactically, therefore, even if ultimately lost on the merits, the lawsuit for
educational injuries serves the democratically supportive purpose of caus-
ing [education] officials... to pay attention to grievances arising out of
the disputed practices.2 9 0
Not only is it arguable that such do not serve "democratically sup-
portive purposes" (particularly where the grievances are illegiti-
mate, as presumably they would be if the suits are "lost on the
merits"), but also the impact on classroom decorum and student
discipline cannot be overlooked. In some schools, the students al-
ready come to class armed. Must they also come armed with a
lawsuit? One of the causes of educational malpractice is often
seen to be "crisis-laden" school systems.29 ' It is difficult to see
how recognition of this new cause of action will diminish the cri-
ses.
Besides, disruption of the educational process can occur in
ways other than relaxation of school discipline or deterioration in
student-teacher relations. Yet one more negative impact that
would be probable to arise from allowing suits for educational
malpractice would be to inhibit experimentation in teaching tech-
288. Note, supra note 58, at 34.
289. E.g., Elson, supra note 9, at 664-67.
290. Id. at 666.
291. E.g., id. at 665.
niques. 292 Even a particularized holding that an individual
teacher's use of a specific experimental approach constituted mal-
practice, in view of the needs and abilities of that teacher's stu-
dents, would have a general deterrent effect upon all other
teachers within that court's jurisdiction. These other teachers
will no doubt feel inhibited to some degree in using any new or
experimental technique, even if their students' academic capaci-
ties and needs are different than those of the losing teacher-de-
fendant. After all, their students' ability to sue will be the same.
In terms of teaching practices, there is also an ironic, alterna-
tive risk presented by educational malpractice suits. The educa-
tional malpractice plaintiff would, in effect, be asking a court to
decide what instructional practices are legally acceptable. A deci-
sion in favor of the defendant would constitute a judicial state-
ment implicitly--or, perhaps, even explicitly-legitimating the
challenged practice. It is not inconceivable that an idiosyncratic
judge might endorse a peculiar teaching practice which would
then be followed by educators in that jurisdiction (and, perhaps,
by educators in other jurisdictions as well) in order to protect
themselves and limit their own liability.
The optimism of the reformers that judicial intervention will
improve the quality of education appears, therefore, to be mis-
placed. At best, recognizing liability for educational malpractice
would create more uniformity in the quality of public education.
But it will be a uniformity achieved by reducing expectations of
student performance, enforcing minimal standards, and stultify-
ing the experimentation that may lead to educational progress.
In fact, it may be argued that this is already the direction that
American educators have taken in response to the "accountabil-
ity" movement.293 "Competency-based education" (CBE), the
current catchword in educational reform, may be little more than
a synonym for "defensive education."294
The emphasis in competency-based education is upon achieve-
292. Possibly this problem could "be overcome by giving parents the choice of
putting their children in experimental classes; the doctrine of assumption of risk
would then allow experimentation undeterred by the threat of damages or dismis-
sal." Comment, supra note 19, at 764. But see note 227 supra. Presumably, were
such a course of action open, school districts would then attempt to limit their lia-
bility by requiring parents to sign a blanket waiver as soon as their children enter
school The validity of such an instrument, however, is subject to serious doubt;
see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
293. Regarding "accountability," see notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
294. See generally Reilly, Competency-Based Educatiomn Pros and Cons, 14 AM.
EDUC. 21 (1978); Spady, Concept and Implication of Competency Based Education,
36 EDUC. LEADERS=IP 16 (1978); id., Competency-Based Education: A Bandwagon
in Search of a Definition, 6 EDUC. RESEARCHER 9 (1977).
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ment, rather than upon spending an arbitrarily prescribed
number of years within the school system. According to its ten-
ets, educational policymakers are to transform generalized expec-
tations of student achievement into written "behavioral
objectives." These objectives reflect a general consensus as to the
level of ability that students at a particular grade level should ex-
hibit in subjects such as reading, writing, and arithmetic. Almost
invariably, standardized tests are then used to assess whether
and how many students have attained the prescribed minimum
levels of proficiency. These tests results are, in turn, taken as a
measure of how well the schools are performing their public man-
date to educate the students. 295 Some systems, in fact, have car-
ried the emphasis upon test outcomes to its logical conclusion
and allow children, once they have attained a minimum age, to re-
ceive a high school diploma and leave school as soon as they have
passed the minimum competency tests. 296 For those who cannot
meet the basic skill requirements, remedial instruction is of-
fered.297
The concept of competency-based education has proven so pop-
ular that in most states it is now legislatively mandated. 29 8 Like
most palliatives, however, it is deceptively seductive.299 Where
school personnel are to be called to task for not meeting the spec-
ified goals, the intrinsic dynamic of the process encourages set-
ting the goals as low as possible. Moreover, where the early-out
concept is employed, these minimum competency levels have a
way of becoming the behavioral maximums. In like manner,
competency-based education denigrates the arts and humanities.
The tests emphasize "life-role" skills, and the schools emphasize
the tests. Indeed, test-taking skills become the primary instruc-
tional focus, even though improved test scores do not necessarily
correlate with improved educational levels.
295. The process is described in L BROWDER, supra note 4, at 9-16.
296. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 85745 (West 1977); Fiske, Connecticut to Let
Students, 16, Quit High School Early, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
297. E.g., CAL. EDuC. CODE § 8574.5 (West 1977).
298. For a detailed, state-by-state summary of legislative action up to the time
of its publication, see Pipho, Minimum Competency in 1978: A Look at State Stan-
dards, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 585 (1978); see also N.Y. Times Nov. 20, 1977, § 1, at 31,
col. 5.
299. Fiske, Educator Is Critical of Competency Tests, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977,
§ 1, at 43, col. 1; Wise, The Hyper-rationalization of American Education, 35 EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 354 (1978). The criticisms of competency testing suggested in the fol-
lowing paragraph are explored more fully in these two articles.
Most seriously, minimum competency testing involves danger-
ous potentials for discrimination and violation of students' due
process rights.300 The cultural biases inherent in most standard-
ized tests raise serious question about, if they do not invalidate,
the use of such instruments to measure the educational achieve-
ment of minority group students or those from culturally disad-
vantaged backgrounds.301 Test questions are often irrelevant to
minority community experiences, while answers reflecting those
experiences receive no test credit. Extreme anxiety about poor
performance and lack of prior exposure to testing vocabulary are
also factors that can produce inaccurate test scores for minority
pupils. 302 Yet, without standardized tests, competency-based edu-
cation would have to rely upon teachers' subjective appraisals,
evaluations that all too frequently may reflect personal bias and
prejudice.30 3
In terms of a cause of action for educational malpractice, how-
ever, the principal difficulty with minimum competency testing is
that the courts might make test scores a measure of instructional
competence. Particularly in those states where competency-
based education is established by statute, a court might take test
scores as establishing, for example, the necessary duty, standard
of care, and measure of injury to sustain a malpractice action
based on a negligence theory.304 Ironically, then, rather than
avoiding judicial intervention, the establishing of minimum com-
petency standards may invite increased litigation over academic
300. McClung, supra note 267; Lewis, Certifying Functional Literacy: Compe-
tency Testing and Implications for Due Process and Equal Educational Opportu-
nity, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 145 (1979); Clague, Competency Testing and Potential
Constitutional Challenges of "Everystudent," 28 CATHOIC U. L. REV. 469 (1979);
McClung, Competency Testing Program: Legal and Educational Issues, 47 FoRtD.
L. REV. 651 (1979).
In addition, a problem with any test is, of course, the possibility that its results
will be misused; see IL LvymA, TEST ScoREs AND WHAT THEY MEAN (2d ed. 1971).
301. Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (passage of func-
tional literacy examination as a prerequisite to receipt of high school diploma held
unconstitutional), noted in 10 Cum. L. REv. 863 (1980). See also Teicher, Minimum
Competency Test Requirements for High School Graduation: Are We Boxing in
Minority Students for a Lifetime of Failure?, 8 HumN' RIGHTS 20 (1980).
302. Williams, Black Pride, Academic Relevance, and Individual Achievement,
in CRUCIAL ISSUES IN TESTING 13 (1974); J. LOEHLIN, G. LINDZEY & J. SPUHLER, RACE
DIFFERENCES IN INTELLIGENCE (1975); W. MEHRENS & i LEHMANN, STANDARDIZED
TESTS IN EDUCATION 341 (2d ed. 1975).
303. But cf. Goodman, supra note 181, at 33 (assessments by experienced
teachers who have daily contact with student more meaningful than testing de-
vices).
304. See Note, Implications of Minimum Competency Legislation: A Legal Duty
of Care, 10 PAc. L. J. 947 (1979). Problems of establishing causation would, how-
ever, remain. Nor would minimum competency statutes provide any guidance as
to selection of an appropriate remedy or, if a monetary award were the remedial
device chosen, how to calculate the damages.
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instru.ction.30 5 For the reasons already surveyed, however, the ju-
diciary should decline to accept the invitation.306 To make test
scores a measure of liability would only accelerate the already
undesirable trend toward defensive education, i.e. lower expecta-
tions, institute tests geared to those expectations, and then teach
to the tests.
Educators should be allowed to define for themselves the signif-
icance of student achievement tests with respect to teacher com-
petence.30 7 Presently, under the influence of the "accountability"
movement, test results are perhaps being given inappropriate
weight. But this does not argue that the judiciary should join the
movement. Legislative and administrative solutions have flex-
ibility to recommend them over judicial; and, once the ardor for
competency-based education has cooled, legislators and school
administrators can redress the balance. Unless the courts can pro-
duce better and not just the same solutions to the problems be-
setting American public education, they should stay their hand.
To argue in favor of judicial reluctance to assume the role of ed-
ucational policymaker may strike some as quaint, in light of the
activist role courts have played in recent years on education is-
sues. Judicial review has been afforded to many significant as-
pects of educational policy: school desegregation,308 school
finance, 309 school personnel practices,31 0 and school discipline.311
305. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977, § 1, at 31, col. 6 (predicting such an increase).
Could selection of a particular test constitute educational malpractice? Can stu-
dents sue to challenge the content of the test? Its scoring? The interpretation of
the scores?
306. But cf. Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Central Community School, 488 F.2d 237
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974) (implicitly endorsing school board's
use of student achievement tests as a measure of a teacher's competence).
307. Cf. id. (teacher competence and the standards for its measurement are pe-
culiarly appropriate to local administration).
308. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Swam v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
309. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Ser-
rano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Ca-
hill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
310. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); State Div. of Human Rights v. Westmoreland Central School Dist., 56 App.
Div. 2d 205, 392 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1977).
311. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
But judicial involvement in other areas of school operation need
not justify involvement in questions of what should be taught in
the public schools and how.312 This area may be qualitatively dif-
ferent from those other areas where courts have intervened.3 13
Or, perhaps, judicial interference in those other areas has been
mistaken.314 At the very least, the time has come to draw the
line.315
Such, indeed, has been the lesson the Supreme Court itself has
sought to teach during the past decade. In the Horowitz case,3 16
holding that a hearing was not constitutionally required before a
public medical school could dismiss a student for academic defi-
ciencies, the Court wrote, "We decline to further enlarge the judi-
cial presence in the academic community .... ,"317 Like the
decision to dismiss a student, determinations of academic quality
and instructional competence require experienced evaluations of
cumulative information not readily adapted to the procedural
tools of the judicial process. Rather, like educational finance,318
312. In fact, the very scope of the judicial effort in other educational matters,
together with the reality that questions such as desegregation and school finance
are far from settled and will require continued judicial oversight for the foresee-
able future, may constitute an argument against the courts' entertaining suits for
educational malpractice. As the late Professor Robert McCloskey, discussing an-
other aspect of school-court interaction, put the matter some years ago,
On the basis of power and value considerations together, a strong case
could be made for judicial avoidance of the whole issue.... [TIhe evil in
its present manifestations is fairly moderate. Even so, judicial correction
of it might be warranted, if there were no other, graver wrongs simultane-
ously pressing for judicial attention and also taxing the power capacities
of the [courts]. But when we take into account that there are those other
wrongs, the price of dealing with this one may seem very dear indeed.
McCloskey, Principles, Powers, and Values: The Establishment Clause and the
Supreme Court, 1964 RELIGION AND THE PuBLIc ORDER 3, 28.
313. Cf. Comment, supra note 8, at 589 ("historical record does appear to favor
judicial noninterference"); Note, supra note 11, at 349 (courts have become in-
volved in education issues only in the face of "a gross violation").
314. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 2; Note, supra note 188; D. HoRowrrz,
supra note 248; Hazard, supra note 264.
315. But of. Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 916-23 (1976) (catalogue of state court activism in
education).
316. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
The significance of Horowitz will depend upon whether lower courts confine it to
its facts or read it as a broad condemnation of judicial review of evaluative aca-
demic judgments.
317. Id. at 90. The most extreme statement of judicial restraint in cases involv-
ing the schools is to be found in Mr. Justice Powell's dissent in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 593-94 (1975). See also West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
318. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But see
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); 18 Cal. 3d 728,
557 P.2d 929, 135 CaL Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
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this is a subject best left to local citizen participation and control.
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, the Court also commented on
the issue of educational quality when it concluded that "commu-
nities deserve the freedom and incentive to turn their attention
and energies to [the] ... goal of quality education, free from pro-
tracted and debilitating battles over court-ordered student trans-
portation"3 1 9-and, one might add, over court-ordered adoption of
particular educational strategies.
V. CONCLUSION
It would be fatuous to minimize the problems confronting
American public education. Admittedly among these, especially
in large urban school systems, is the problem of substandard in-
structional performance. But the common law is not the appro-
priate vehicle for correcting that problem. Whether based on
contract, misrepresentation, constitutional right, or negligence,
each of the legal theories thus far advanced to support a cause of
action for educational malpractice has proven, upon closer analy-
sis, to be inadequate. In each instance, one or more of the requi-
site elements is lacking, and the proposed cause of action is, thus,
fatally defective.
It would be erroneous to ignore the evolutionary nature of the
law. But that evolution need not always be in the direction of
ever-increasing judicial involvement in educational policy. Courts
have not always behaved toward education as they are now be-
having,320 nor need they continue to so behave.
Arguments, both sophisticated and sophistic, may be fashioned
by analogy to other, presently recognized causes of action. But
good and sufficient policy reasons sustain the courts' continued
refusal to recognize educational malpractice as a viable cause of
action. In contrast to the reformers' act of faith that judicial inter-
vention in the guise of educational malpractice suits will improve
the quality of public education lies the reality that such actions
would more likely result in redirecting energies and funds away
from the educative function and into the defense of lawsuits.3 21
319. 413 U.S. 189, 253 (1973).
320. See J. HOGAN, supra note 156, at 5-6 (identifying five separate and distinct
stages in the evolution of educational jurisprudence).
321. An alternative theory, suggested but not advanced here, is that recognition
of a cause of action for educational malpractice would simply amount to a judicial
attempt to prop up an obviously failing public school system. If the courts really
The nation's teachers and school boards perform an important
public function with limited resources. But, were educational
malpractice to be recognized as a cause of action, these same
teachers and boards could become the object of the animus of any
member of the community. Whatever benefit this might provide
to an individual plaintiff would be more than counterbalanced by
the detrimental impact upon the quality of education as a whole.
There appears to be no way to avoid such an outcome, short of ex-
cluding these suits completely. The "inability to perceive reason-
able limits in the area of ... recovery for educational
malpractice, combined with the virtually limitless possibilities of
harassment and burden upon the school system, if such suits are
allowed,"322 should result in the courts' continued foreclosure of
such litigation.
wanted to make a contribution to educational quality, so the theory would run,
they could do so by modifying existing equal protection and First Amendment
doctrine to make education vouchers, issued by the state and redeemable by any
school, a legally viable alternative. But see Committee for Public Educ. and Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976); Wollman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). See generally King, Rebuilding the
"Fallen House"-State Tuition Grants for Elementary and Secondary Education,
84 HARv. L. REV. 1057 (1971).
322. Diamond, supra note 57, at 151-52.
